Arkansas Law Review
Volume 74

Number 3

Article 4

December 2021

Korematsu’s Ancestors
Mark A. Graber
University of Maryland

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Fourteenth
Amendment Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Race
Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Mark A. Graber, Korematsu’s Ancestors, 74 Ark. L. Rev. 425 (2021).
Available at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr/vol74/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Arkansas Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact
scholar@uark.edu.

2 GRABER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/13/21 2:47 PM

KOREMATSU’S ANCESTORS
Mark A. Graber*
Mark Killenbeck’s Korematsu v. United States1 has
important affinities with Dred Scott v. Sandford.2 Both decisions
by promoting and justifying white supremacy far beyond what
was absolutely mandated by the constitutional text merit their
uncontroversial inclusion in the anticanon of American
constitutional law.3 Dred Scott held that former slaves and their
descendants could not be citizens of the United States4 and that
Congress could not ban slavery in American territories acquired
after the Constitution was ratified.5 Korematsu held that the
military could exclude all Japanese Americans from portions of
the West Coast during World War II.6 Both decisions
nevertheless provided progressives with important doctrinal tools
that they later employed when building a more egalitarian future.
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott advanced a
particularly robust notion of citizenship that Republicans, after
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, cited when vesting
newly freed persons of color with a substantial array of rights.7
Korematsu introduced the strict scrutiny test into American law

*
Mark A. Graber is the Regents Professor at the University of Maryland Carey School
of Law. He is grateful for the help provided by the Arkansas Law Review at the University
of Arkansas, most notably by Keaton Barnes, Taylor Spillers, and Tyler Mlakar, the
comments given by Associate Peter Danchin and his colleagues at the University of
Maryland Carey School of Law, and other comments by Mark Killenbeck, Sandy Levinson
and Jack Balkin.
1. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
2. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
3. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 406-12, 422-27 (2011);
Mark R. Killenbeck, Sober Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered, 74 ARK. L. REV.
151, 151-52 (2021).
4. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 423.
5. See id. at 452.
6. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24.
7. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 101 (1866); CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1231 (1866).
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that the Warren and Burger Courts relied on when striking down
numerous laws that discriminated against persons of color.8
Killenbeck celebrates strict scrutiny as a remarkable advance
on the doctrines that structured the constitutional law of racial
equality in the racist past of the United States.9 Federal and state
courts before the Civil War provided almost no protection for
persons of color, even in the few instances when judges
acknowledged that persons of color might be state or federal
citizens.10 At the turn of the twentieth century, federal and state
courts did almost nothing to oppose the redemption of the South
and the establishment of Jim Crow.11 Plessy v. Ferguson
sustained legislation mandating separate but equal.12 Giles v.
Harris announced courts could do little when states adopted
subterfuges that disenfranchised almost all black citizens.13
African Americans fared better in federal courts in the decades
before Korematsu.14 Still, most judicial successes before World
War II were confined to particularly egregious facts and easily
evaded.15 The strict scrutiny test was the first occasion in which
a Supreme Court majority announced a broad standard of review
that could be wielded against white supremacy more generally
rather than merely against discrete instances of white
supremacy.16
This essay explores how the constitutional law of race
equality has evolved in the United States in ways that provide
8. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984). For the development of the strict scrutiny test in race cases, see
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1275-78 (2007).
9. Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 189-201.
10. See infra notes 69-94 and accompanying text.
11. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 8-60 (2004).
12. 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896).
13. 189 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1903).
14. See generally KLARMAN, supra note 11.
15. The judicial decision outlawing state mandated residential segregation in
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917), was effectively undermined by the judicial
decision sanctioning racially restrictive covenants in Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 332
(1926). The judicial decisions in Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927), and Nixon
v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88-89 (1932), striking down state laws prohibiting persons of color
from voting in Democratic primaries were effectively undermined by the judicial decision in
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 54-55 (1935), which permitted the Democratic Party to
prohibit persons of color from voting in Democratic primaries.
16. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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greater context for the strict scrutiny test and the Korematsu
decision. The contemporary Korematsu regime is structured by
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
judicial supremacy, and strict scrutiny.17 The Equal Protection
Clause provides the textual hook for evaluating the
constitutionality of race conscious measures, the Supreme Court
of the United States is the institution primarily responsible for
implementing the Equal Protection Clause, and strict scrutiny is
the test or standard the Supreme Court uses to determine whether
race conscious measures pass constitutional muster.18 Other
regimes have been structured by different textual hooks,
alternative conceptions of institutional authority, and other tests
or standards for evaluating race conscious measures. The Turner
regime of the mid-1860s regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as
the foundation for the constitutional law of racial equality.19 The
Turner regime and the successor Strauder regime of the 1870s
and 1880s vested Congress with the primary responsibility of
determining how to implement the constitutional obligation to
end the slave system and make persons of color full citizens.20
The Strauder regime and successor Plessy regime of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries banned, at least
officially, all race discriminations.21
The Korematsu regime is clearly more egalitarian than the
Costin/Manuel regime that structured the constitutional law of
race equality before the Civil War, but the former has features that
make that regime arguably less egalitarian in certain
circumstances than the Turner, Strauder, and Plessy regimes.
The Turner regime that based the constitutional law of racial
equality on the Thirteenth Amendment was more open than the
Korematsu regime to race conscious measures designed to benefit
persons of color and had no state action limit on federal laws that
mandated racial equality.22 The Turner and Strauder regimes that
17. See Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 189-201.
18. Id.
19. See In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339-40 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).
20. Id.; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1879).
21. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310-12; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896).
22. Compare Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339-40, with Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944).
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required Congress to be the first mover when implementing
constitutional commitments to racial equality were more
conducive to racial equality than the Korematsu regime whenever
the national legislature had a more expansive understanding of
racial equality than the national judiciary. The Strauder and
Plessy regimes would, at least in theory, have declared
unconstitutional the military order sustained in Korematsu
because those regimes prohibited all race discriminations.
The following pages contextualize rather than praise or bury
the Korematsu regime. Whether one particular regime better
promotes racial equality than another depends on the particular
problem, the balance of power in different institutions at a
particular time, and particular perspectives. Strict scrutiny might
be a better approach than a per se ban on race classifications when
regulating racial gangs in prisons. The Supreme Court could not
have decided Brown v. Board of Education when the Turner and
Strauder regimes structured the constitutional law of racial
equality because those regimes required Congress to be the first
mover when implementing the post-Civil War Amendments.
Whether a regime that permits affirmative action is better than
one that does not depends on contested beliefs about whether
affirmative action promotes race equality. The argument below
is simply that the Korematsu regime is one way of structuring the
constitutional law of racial equality, not the only way. That
Americans committed to racial equality have adopted different
regimes in the past opens questions about whether Americans
might adopt different regimes in the future.
Strict scrutiny is a standard only for race conscious measures
such as the military order banning Japanese Americans from the
West Coast. That standard does not help determine whether a
military order in 1943 banning disloyal citizens would have been
considered a race discrimination if implemented only in
California or, for that matter, whether the executive order at issue
in Trump v. Hawaii23 that Killenbeck explores with great
sophistication24 was a “Muslim ban.” Korematsu’s ancestors

23. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
24. Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 201-23.
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include such cases as Costin v. Washington,25 In re Turner,26
Strauder v. West Virginia,27 and Plessy v. Ferguson.28 These
decisions considered whether explicit race conscious measures
passed constitutional muster.29 Although Killenbeck and the
major opinions in Trump debated whether Korematsu belonged
on Trump’s family tree,30 Trump’s more legitimate lineal
ancestors include United States v. Cruikshank,31 Williams v.
Mississippi,32 and McCleskey v. Kemp.33 The Justices in these
instances refused to see or find race discrimination lurking behind
laws or actions that on their face were not race conscious.34
This essay explores the constitutional law of explicit race
conscious measures. This myopia admittedly exaggerates the
egalitarian commitments of the Turner, Strauder, Plessy, and
Korematsu regimes. Racial hierarchies in the United States in the
past and at present are as often structured by the refusal to
acknowledge race as by what Americans do when they
acknowledge race. Americans, this essay documents, have often
shamefully justified their willingness to use race conscious
measures that discriminate against persons of color. Americans
have even more shamefully refused to see race discrimination
when government employs ostensibly neutral measures in ways
that oppress, often by intention, black Americans and other
persons of color.
I. THE COSTIN/MANUEL REGIME
Judge William Cranch’s opinion in Costin v. Washington
articulated the principles that structured the status of citizens of
25. 6 F. Cas. 612 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266).
26. 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).
27. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
28. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
29. See Costin, 6 F. Cas. at 613-14; Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339-40; Strauder, 100 U.S.
at 303; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540.
30. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018); Id. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting); Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 152-159.
31. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
32. 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
33. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
34. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 556; Williams, 170 U.S. at 225; McCleskey, 481 U.S.
at 319.
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color under antebellum constitutional law.35 The issue in that
case was the constitutionality of the onerous restrictions that the
corporation governing Washington D.C. placed on persons of
color.36 Persons of color were required to register, provide bonds
for good behavior, and obtain certificates from three white
persons vouching for their character and employment.37 In sharp
contrast to Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney’s opinion in Dred
Scott,38 Cranch’s opinion in Costin assumed that persons of color
were citizens of the United States entitled to the rights of citizens
of the United States.39
Costin acknowledged that “the
constitution gives equal rights to all the citizens of the United
States.”40 Cranch insisted, however, that governing officials
could make legal distinctions among citizens. Race was one
important basis for legal distinctions. Costin stated:
In all the states certain qualifications are necessary to the
right of suffrage; the right to serve on juries, and the right to
hold certain offices; and in most of the states the absence of
the African color is among those qualifications. Every state
has the right to pass laws to preserve the peace and the
morals of society; and if there be a class of people more
likely than others to disturb the public peace, or corrupt the
public morals, and if that class can be clearly designated, it
has a right to impose upon that class, such reasonable terms
and conditions of residence, as will guard the state from the
evils which it has reason to apprehend.41

The Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v. Manuel
relied on similar principles when the judges concluded black
citizenship was consistent with substantial race discrimination.42
A unanimous court ruled that persons of color convicted of crimes
could be hired out, even though white persons convicted of the

35. 6 F. Cas. 612, 613-14 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856).
39. Costin, 6 F. Cas. at 613.
40. Id. But cf. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404 (holding that persons of color were not
citizens of the United States and were therefore not entitled to the rights of United States
citizens).
41. Costin, 6 F. Cas. at 613.
42. 4 Dev. & Bat. 20, 37 (N.C. 1838).
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same crimes could not suffer this sanction.43 Judge William
Gaston declared, “[h]is color and his poverty are the aggravating
circumstances of his crime.”44 Gaston insisted that real
differences between the races justified punishing citizens of color
more severely than white citizens:
Whatever might be thought of a penal Statute which in its
enactments makes distinctions between one part of the
community and another capriciously and by way of
favoritism, it cannot be denied that in the exercise of the
great powers confided to the legislature for the suppression
and punishment of crimes, they may rightfully so apportion
punishments according to the condition, temptations to
crime, and ability to suffer, of those who are likely to offend,
as to produce in effect that reasonable and practical equality
in the administration of justice which it is the object of all
free governments to accomplish.45

That William Manuel was a citizen of North Carolina did not
immunize him from discriminatory punishments because he was
in a racial class that the state legislature had determined needed
more severe sanctions to deter them from crime.
The constitutional law of race equality in antebellum
America was indistinguishable from the constitutional law of
equality, more generally. The Costin/Manual regime emphasized
arbitrary laws rather than suspect classifications.46 No legal
distinction was inherently more suspect than another or required
legislators to meet a higher standard of proof—either as the end
to be achieved or the relationship between the discrimination and
that end. John Marque Lundin points out that while antebellum
law respected principles of “equality, reasonableness,
impartiality, and protection of fundamental rights, the prohibited
classification principle” dates from Reconstruction.47 Laws that
singled out persons of color were constitutionally no different

43. Id.
44. Id. at 35.
45. Id. at 37.
46. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 54-55 (Duke Univ. Press
1993); John Marquez Lundin, The Law of Equality Before Equality Was Law, 49 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1137, 1139 (1999).
47. Lundin, supra note 46, at 1139.
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than laws that singled out bankers, taverns, women, or residents
of E street.
The constitutionality of legal distinctions and
discriminations depended on whether they were based on real
differences between the regulated and unregulated classes and
whether the distinction or discrimination served the public
interest.48 Any legislative distinction that served the public
interest and was based on real differences between persons was
constitutional. Howard Gillman notes that the master principle of
nineteenth century constitutional law was that when “a statute is
enacted applying only to a particular class, it must appear that the
public welfare demands such legislation by reason of the
distinguishing characteristic of the class.”49 Abolitionists and
antislavery advocates aside,50 no one considered race
discriminations the paradigmatic example of an unconstitutional
arbitrary distinction. Most successful equality claims concerned
property rights51 rather than discrimination based on race, gender,
or ethnicity.52 No state court opinion issued before the Fourteenth
Amendment indicated that a central purpose of any constitutional
provision mandating equality was to limit race discriminations,
that race discriminations were particularly offensive in light of
constitutional commitments to equality, or that race
discriminations required a higher degree of judicial scrutiny than
other legislative discriminations.53
Costin and Manuel were structured by this understanding of
constitutional equality. Neither treats race distinctions as any

48. Id. at 1184–85.
49. GILLMAN, supra note 46, at 93 (quoting Anonymous, Some Restrictions upon
Legislative Power, 43 ALB. L.J. 25, 25–27 (1891)).
50. See JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 95, 96-97 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1951); Howard Jay Graham, The Early
Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, Part I, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 479, 491,
506 (1950); Howard Jay Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Part II, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 610, 613 (1950); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 18 (Harvard Univ. Press 1988).
51. See Planter’s Bank v. Sharp, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 301, 325 (1848) (“This is . . . very
invidious legislation, when applied to classes or to particular kinds of property before
allowed to be held generally. Legislation for particular cases or contracts . . . is of very
doubtful validity.”).
52. See Lundin, supra note 46, at 1141.
53. See Lundin, supra note 46, at 1181.
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more or less offensive to the law than other distinctions. Both
explore whether real differences exist between the races and
whether the law based on these differences serves the public
interest. Both conclude that racial differences exist that justify
laws in the public interest.54 Neither assumes a different mode of
analysis would be appropriate if white persons were being legally
burdened. Both treat constitutional equality as requiring justices
to make fact judgments rather than rely on categorical analyses.55
Many antebellum judicial decisions justifying racial
discrimination did so by claiming that the main difference
between white persons and persons of color was that only white
persons were citizens.56 The Supreme Court of Tennessee, when
sustaining a ban on black immigration to the state declared, “free
negroes . . . are not citizens in the sense of the Constitution; and
therefore when coming among us are not entitled to all the
‘privileges and immunities’ of citizens of this State.”57 The
Supreme Court of South Carolina, in White v. Tax Collector of
Kershaw District, determining that free blacks were subject to a
special tax, declared, “[a] firm and wise policy has excluded this
class from the rights of citizenship in this and almost every State
in which they are found.”58 Slaves gained few rights, the Supreme
Court of Georgia declared, when freed by their former masters.59
Bryan v. Walton decreed, “the act of manumission confers no
54. Justice Lemuel Shaw in Roberts v. City of Boston engaged in similar analysis when
holding that segregated schools were consistent with the equality and citizenship rights
enjoyed by persons of color because separating the races promoted the public welfare. He
claimed, the school board could reasonably conclude that “the good of both classes of schools
will be best promoted, by maintaining the separate primary schools for colored and for white
children . . . .” 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 209 (1849).
55. See Costin v. Corp. of Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266);
State v. Manuel, 3 & 4 Dev. & Bat. 20 (N.C. 1838).
56. See Pendleton v. State, 6 Ark. 509, 512, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (1846); Aldridge v.
Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 447, 449 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1824) (declaring that persons of
color were not “comprehended” by the state “Constitution or Bill of Rights”); Bryan’s Heirs
v. Dennis, 4 Fla. 445, 453–54 (1852) (declaring that free persons of color are “neither
freemen nor slaves”); Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326, 344 (1822); see also MARK A.
GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 29 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2006).
57. State v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. (Meigs) 331, 341 (1838); see Pendleton, 6 Ark. at 509,
___ S.W.3d at ___ (sustaining a state ban on black immigration because persons of color
could be neither citizens of the United States nor citizens of Arkansas).
58. 37 S.C.L. (3 Rich.) 136, 139 (S.C. Ct. App. 1846).
59. See Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 201-02 (1853).
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other right but that of freedom from the dominion of the master,
and the limited liberty of locomotion; that it does not and cannot
confer citizenship, nor any of the powers, civil or political,
incident to citizenship.”60 Florida case law maintained that free
persons of color could not claim any rights at all as a matter of
constitutional grace.61 “[T]he rights of free negroes,” Clark v.
Gautier stated, “depend entirely upon municipal regulations.”62
Costin and Manual established that black citizenship was no
bar against race discrimination. Jacksonians were convinced that
real differences existed between white persons and persons of
color. Chancellor James Kent’s extraordinarily influential
Commentaries on American Law declared that “[t]he African
race, even when free, are essentially a degraded caste, of inferior
rank and condition in society.”63 Sidney George Fisher, a leading
northern political and constitutional commentator, maintained:
These races are distinguished by clearly defined and
different organic physical structure, and also by different
mental and moral traits, more especially by inequality of
mental and moral force, and have been so distinguished,
without change, in all ages.64

The same principles, at least in theory, governed actual laws
that discriminated against persons of color as hypothetical laws
that discriminated against white persons. The crucial issue in
both circumstances was whether racial differences were real and
whether the law served the public interest. This inquiry required
justices to make fact inquiries. Constitutional decision makers
had to determine whether a real difference existed between the
races. They then had to determine whether the law based on that
real difference served the public interest. Such laws, providing
benefits to black Americans denied to their white neighbors, did
not exist before the Civil War because neither Jacksonian
legislators nor Jacksonian judges could imagine a real difference
60. Id. at 198.
61. See Clark v. Gautier, 8 Fla. 360, 362 (1859).
62. Id. at 363.
63. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 258 (John M. Gould ed.,
Little, Brown, & Co., 14th ed. 1896). See, e.g., Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 346 (1834).
64. SIDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE LAWS OF RACE, AS CONNECTED WITH SLAVERY
10 (Philadelphia, Willis P. Hazard 1860).
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between white persons and persons of color that might justify a
law that placed special burdens on white persons or gave special
benefits to persons of color.65
Judges enforced the constitutional law of equality during the
Costin/Manual regime. By the Civil War, a well-developed state
jurisprudence existed establishing the basic parameters of
constitutional equality.66 The Supreme Court of Tennessee,
which was quite deferential in Manual when sustaining race
discriminations against persons of color, was a judicial leader in
setting the standards for scrutinizing discriminations between
different classes of white persons. Wally’s Heirs v. Kennedy,
when striking down a law that forbade courts from hearing certain
lawsuits brought for the benefit of other persons, insisted that
“every partial or private law which directly proposes to destroy or
affect individual rights, or does the same thing by affording
remedies leading to similar consequences, is unconstitutional and
void.”67 Justice Nathan Green elaborated on the judicial
responsibility for implementing constitutional “law of the land”
clauses, declaring, “[d]oes it not seem conclusive then, that this
provision was intended to restrain the legislature from enacting
any law affecting injuriously the rights of any citizen, unless at
the same time the rights of all others in similar circumstances
were equally affected by it?”68
An examination of race cases only would barely detect this
commitment to judicial power. Courts sustained almost all race
conscious measures that were adjudicated before the Civil War.
With the exception of a California decision holding that a state
65. Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96
MICH. L. REV. 245, 252–54 (1997).
66. See GILLMAN, supra note 46, at 54; Saunders, supra note 65, 252–54; see also
Durkee v. City of Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 465 (1871) (citing numerous cases from numerous
state courts decided before 1865 for the “principle of constitutional law which prohibits
unequal and partial legislation upon general subjects . . . .”).
67. 10 Tenn. 554, 555 (1831); see Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. 260, 269-70 (1829)
(“That a partial law, tending directly or indirectly to deprive a corporation or an individual
or rights to property, or to the equal benefits of the general and public laws of the land, is
unconstitutional and void, we do not doubt.”); James v. Adm’rs of G.W. Reynolds, 2 Tex.
250, 252 (1847) (“[G]eneral public laws, binding all the members of the community under
similar circumstances, and not partial or private laws, affecting the rights of private
individuals, or classes of individuals.”).
68. State Bank v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. 599, 606 (1831).
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tax on Chinese immigrants was inconsistent with federal
commerce power,69 no free state court declared unconstitutional
any law discriminating against free persons of color.70 Free state
justices sustained or implemented without commentary laws
limiting the testimony of persons of color,71 allocating taxes on
the basis of race,72 mandating different guardianship rules on the
basis of race,73 prohibiting persons of color from attending public
schools,74 banning persons of color from voting75 or holding
public offices,76 forbidding persons of color from marrying a
white person77 or performing marriages,78 and refusing to permit
persons of color to reside in the state.79
Southern courts were even worse. The Supreme Court of
Georgia in Bryan v. Walton highlighted the narrow distance
between the legal status of free persons of color and the legal
status of slaves when noting that:
[T]he status of the African in Georgia, whether bond or free,
is such that he has no civil, social or political rights or
capacity, whatever, except such as are bestowed on him by
69. People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169, 171 (1857).
70. But see Op. of J. Appleton, 44 Me. 521, 575–76 (1857) (declaring in an advisory
opinion that free persons of color had a right to vote in Maine).
71. See Clark v. Gautier, 8 Fla. 360, 361 (1859).
72. See White v. Tax Collector of Kershaw Dist., 37 S.C.L. (3 Rich.) 136, 136 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1846).
73. See Thaxter v. Grinnell, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 13, 14–15 (1840).
74. See Williams v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist., No. 6, Wright 579, 580 (Ohio 1834); Chalmers
v. Stewart, 11 Ohio 386, 387 (1842); Lewis v. Henley, 2 Ind. 332, 332 (1850) (separate
schools may be organized, but not constitutionally required); Draper v. Cambridge, 20 Ind.
268, 269 (1863).
75. See Hobbs v. Fogg, 6 Watts 553, 555-56 (Pa. 1837); State v. Deshler, 25 N.J.L.
177, 188 (N.J. 1855); People v. Dean, 14 Mich. 406, 438 (1866); Anderson v. Milliken, 9
Ohio St. 568, 570 (1859); Morrison v. Springer, 15 Iowa 304, 306 (1863).
76. See State ex rel. Dirs. of E. & W. Sch. Dists. v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio 178, 197 (1850)
(holding that a school board director is not an officer of the state that must be held by a white
person).
77. See Samuel v. Berry, 7 Mich. 467 (1859); Bailey v. Fiske, 34 Me. 77, 78 (1852);
Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 57 (1810).
78. State v. Ct. of Common Pleas, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 20, 22 (Ohio 1843).
79. People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169, 170 (1857); Barkshire v. State, 7 Ind. 389, 389
(1856); Nelson v. People, 33 Ill. 390, 390 (1864); Glenn v. People, 17 Ill. 105, 106-07 (1855)
(upholding a ban on persons of color residing in the state though refusing to enforce the ban
on other grounds). Three Supreme Court Justices in the Passenger Cases approved state
laws banning persons of color. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 429 (1849). See also
People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 142, 146 (1860) (dicta suggesting that prosecutors should be
permitted to present evidence that Chinese residents tend to resist tax collection).
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Statute; that he can neither contract, nor be contracted with;
that the free negro can act only by and through his guardian;
that he is in a state of perpetual pupilage or wardship; and
that this condition he can never change by his own volition.
....
He is associated still with the slave in this State, in some of
the most humiliating incidents of his degradation. —Like
the slave, the free person of color is incompetent to testify
against a free white citizen. He lives under, and is tried by
the same Criminal Code. He has neither vote nor voice in
forming the laws by which he is governed. He is not allowed
to keep or carry fire-arms. He cannot preach or exhort
without a special license, on pain of imprisonment, fine and
corporeal punishment. He cannot be employed in mixing or
vending drugs or medicines of any description. A white man
is liable to a fine of five hundred dollars and imprisonment
in the common jail, at the discretion of the Court, for
teaching a free negro to read and write; and if one free negro
teach another, he is punishable by fine and whipping, or fine
or whipping, at the discretion of the Court. To employ a free
person of color to set up type in a printing office, or any other
labor requiring a knowledge of reading or writing, subjects
the offender to a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars.80

Free persons of color did not get an “0-fer” in slave state
courts. City of Memphis v. Winfield81 declared unconstitutional a
curfew limited to free black citizens. The Supreme Court of
Tennessee described the measure as “an attempt to impair the
liberty of a free person unnecessarily, to restrain him from the
exercise of his lawful pursuits, and to make an innocent act a
crime . . . .”82 The Supreme Court of Kentucky when declaring
unconstitutional a law forbidding persons of color from defending
themselves from an assault initiated by a white person declared
that the legislative power in question “can not [be] exercise[d]
over any man or class of men, be they aliens, free persons of color,
or citizens.”83 The Supreme Courts of Virginia and Georgia held
that a free person of color claimed as a slave had a right to habeas
corpus, although both decisions interpreted statutes that did not
80.
81.
82.
83.

Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 198, 202-03 (1853).
27 Tenn. 707, 709 (1848).
Id.
Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. 70, 75 (1820).
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make explicit race discriminations.84 After noting that the statute
granting rights to habeas corpus did not make a racial distinction,
Judge Tucker of the Virginia Supreme Court stated, “[a] free
negro, as well as a free white man, must be entitled to the benefit
of the habeas corpus act, both according to its language, which is
broad and general, and still more according to its spirit, which is
yet more liberal and beneficent.”85 Georgia justices in State v.
Philpot stated, “the free person of color enjoying personal liberty
has the benefit of the habeas corpus secured to him by a
constitutional guaranty.”86 No state court reached the conclusion
that the legislature had unconstitutionally discriminated against
free blacks, that a law that subjected all persons to the disabilities
the legislature had imposed solely on the basis of race would have
been constitutional.
No consensus developed in the antebellum United States on
the best textual hook to hang constitutional commitments to
equality. Cranch did not point to any provision in any constitution
when in Costin he claimed, “the constitution gives equal rights to
all the citizens of the United States . . . .”87 State courts were
promiscuous when providing the constitutional underpinnings for
equal rights.88 State decisions were rooted in general equality
provisions,89 in “due process” or “law of the land” provisions,90
on constitutional provisions prohibiting exclusive privileges or
special laws,91 on separation of powers grounds92 or on general
84. DeLacy v. Antoine, 34 Va. 438, 449 (1836); State v. Philpot, 1 Dud. 46, 46 (Super.
Ct. Richmond Cnty. 1831).
85. DeLacy, 34 Va. at 444.
86. 1 Dud. at 52.
87. Costin v. Corp. of Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612, 613 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266).
But see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403-27 (1857).
88. Saunders, supra note 65, at 258.
89. In re Dorsey, 7 Port. 293, 360-61 (Ala. 1838); Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326, 336-37
(1825); City of Lexington v. McQuillan’s Heirs, 39 Ky. 513, 516 (1839) (relying on both the
general equality provisions and provisions requiring “equal and uniform” taxation).
90. Budd v. State, 22 Tenn. 483, 490-93 (1842); Regents of the Univ. of Md. v.
Williams, 9 G. & J. 365, 412 (Md. 1838); Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251, 254 (1858).
91. See Thomas v. Bd. of Comm’rs., 5 Ind. 4, 8 (1854) (citing numerous Indiana
decisions declaring legislation “not within the constitutional prohibition of special and local
legislation”); Smith’s Adm’rs. v. Smith, 2 Miss. 102, 103 (1834); McRee v. Wilmington, 47
N.C. 186, 190 (1855); Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa 491, 496-97 (1858); Norwich Gaslight Co.
v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19, 38 (1856).
92. See Regents of Univ. of Md., 9 G. & J. at 411.

2 GRABER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021

12/13/21 2:47 PM

KOREMATSU’S ANCESTORS

439

constitutional principles.93 The Supreme Court of Vermont, in
Ward v. Barnard, without citing any particular provision in the
state constitution, struck down a legislative act on the ground that
“[a]n act conferring upon any one citizen, privileges to the
prejudice of another, and which is not applicable to others, in like
circumstances . . . , does not enter into the idea of municipal law,
having no relation to the community in general.”94 Costin appears
to have relied on the same belief that equality was implicit in
American constitutionalism, even when not explicitly provided
for by constitutional text.
II. THE TURNER REGIME
Chief Justice Salmon Chase’s brief opinion on circuit in In
re Turner captured the constitutional law of race equality during
Reconstruction.95 Elizabeth Turner was emancipated by the
Constitution of Maryland on November 1, 1864.96 She was
almost immediately indentured to her former master Philemon T.
Hambleton.97 The Maryland law of indentures at the time made
a sharp distinction between whites and persons of color.98 As
Chase summarized:
The petitioner, under this indenture, is not entitled to any
education; a white apprentice must be taught reading,
writing, and arithmetic. The petitioner is liable to be
assigned and transferred at the will of the master to any
person in the same county; the white apprentice is not so
liable. The authority of the master over the petitioner is

93. Norwich Gaslight Co., 25 Conn. at 38.
94. Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121, 128 (Vt. 1825); see Lewis, 3 Me. at 332-34; Reed v.
Wright, 2 Greene 15, 27, 28 (Iowa 1849) (treating “law of the land” as a general principle);
Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396, 404-05 (1814); Jones’ Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. 59, 70-71
(1836); State Bank v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. 599, 606 (1831); Wally’s Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn.
554, 555 (1831); Jones v. Vanzandt, 13 F. Cas. 1047, 1048 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7,502).
95. 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). For a discussion of Turner, see
HAROLD H. HYMAN, THE RECONSTRUCTION JUSTICE OF SALMON P. CHASE: IN RE TURNER
AND TEXAS V. WHITE 127-39 (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, KS, 1997).
96. Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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described in the law as a ‘property and interest;’ no such
description is applied to authority over a white apprentice.99

Chase granted Turner’s petition for habeas corpus, releasing her
from Hambleton’s custody on two grounds. First, he declared that
the indenture was an involuntary servitude that directly violated
Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment.100 Second, Chase
ruled that the Maryland indenture law violated the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, which was a constitutional exercise of congressional
power under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment. In re
Turner stated:
[T]he indenture set forth in the return does not contain
important provisions for the security and benefit of the
apprentice which are required by the laws of Maryland in
indenture of white apprentices, and is, therefore, in
contravention of that clause of the first section of the civil
rights law enacted by congress on April 9, 1866, which
assures to all citizens without regard to race or color, “full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.”101

The constitutional law of racial equality in the Turner regime
had three foundations. The Thirteenth Amendment supplied the
textual hook. Congress was the institution primarily responsible
for implementing the constitutional ban on slavery. Chase
declared Hambleton’s failure to provide Turner with the benefits
the Maryland law mandated for white persons violated federal
legislation passed under Section Two of the Thirteenth
Amendment.102 He did not maintain that those provisions of the
indenture would be unconstitutional in the absence of federal
legislation. Congress was the first mover. Congress when
implementing the Thirteenth Amendment could take all steps
necessary to ensure that former slaves were transformed into full
citizens. Chase claimed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
constitutional because “[c]olored persons equally with white
persons are citizens of the United States.”103
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 340.
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Republicans when debating the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and
the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act emphasized the Thirteenth
Amendment as the proper textual hook for the constitutional law
of racial equality.104
Senator Lyman Trumbull’s speech
introducing the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to the Senate declared
with reference to the Black Codes, “[t]he purpose of the bill under
consideration is to destroy all these discriminations, and to carry
into effect the constitutional amendment.”105 The Thirteenth
Amendment’s ban on slavery extended to discriminations against
persons of color because race discriminations in both the free and
slave states were “badges of servitude made in the interest of
slavery and as part of slavery.”106 Trumbull asserted, “[t]hey
never would have been thought of or enacted anywhere but for
slavery, and when slavery falls they fall also.”107
Republican members of the House and Senate during early
Reconstruction insisted that Congress was the institution
primarily responsible for implementing the Thirteenth
Amendment’s commitment to racial equality. Their Thirteenth
Amendment empowered Congress to legislate, not courts to
constrain. Senator Charles Sumner spoke of a “pledge[] to
maintain the emancipated slave in his freedom,” a pledge that
“must be performed by the national government.”108 “[W]hat
makes this constitutional amendment a practical, living thing,”
Senator William Stewart of Nevada stated, “is the power given to
Congress to enforce it by appropriate legislation.”109 In his view,
“it must for years be the effective power of Congress, cooperating
with the Executive, that will protect the freedmen from
oppression . . . .”110 Litigation standing alone, Republicans
insisted, could not destroy the badges and incidents of slavery or
the slave system. When Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania
suggested that persons of color sue to protect their rights, Senator
Henry Wilson of Massachusetts responded, “the Senator says that
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 474 (1865).
Id.
Id. at 322.
Id.
Id. at 91.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 110 (1865).
Id.
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the Constitution of the United States protects these people. I
agree that it does so far as the Constitution can do it; and the
amendment to the Constitution empowers us to pass the necessary
legislation to make them free indeed . . . .”111 Representative
Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota stated, “a grand abstract
declaration, unenforced by the arm of authority, is not a
protection.”112
Congress was empowered under the Thirteenth Amendment
to pass any legislation that helped transform former slaves into
full citizens. The revised Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill
covered:
[A]ll loyal refugees and freedmen, so far as the same shall
be necessary to enable them as speedily as practicable to
become self-supporting citizens of the United States, and to
aid them in making the freedom conferred by proclamation
of the commander-in-chief, by emancipation under the laws
of States, and by constitutional amendment, available to
them and beneficial to the republic.113

Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois maintained:
[U]nder the constitutional amendment which we have now
adopted, and which declares that slavery shall no longer
exist, and which authorizes Congress by appropriate
legislation to carry this provision into effect, I hold that we
have a right to pass any law which, in our judgment, is
deemed appropriate, and which will accomplish the end in
view, secure freedom to all people in the United States. The
various State laws to which I have referred—and there are
many others—although they do not make a man an absolute
slave, yet deprive him of the rights of a freeman; and it is
perhaps difficult to draw the precise line, to say where
freedom ceases and slavery begins, but a law that does not
allow a colored person to go from one county to another is
certainly a law in derogation of the rights of a freeman. A
law that does not allow a colored person to hold property,
does not allow him to teach, does not allow him to preach, is

111. Id. at 340.
112. Id. at 588.
113. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 173-74 (1866).
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certainly a law in violation of the rights of a freeman, and
being so may properly be declared void.114

This power to strike a death blow to slavery included the power
to eradicate the slave system as well as slavery. “Having
prohibited slavery,” Donnelly insisted, “we must not pause for an
instant until the spirit of slavery is extinct, and every trace left by
it in our laws is obliterated.”115 Congress had to grant persons of
color sufficient rights so that no vestige of human bondage
remained. Sumner stated, “[b]eyond all question the protection
of the colored race in civil rights is essential to complete the
abolition of slavery . . . .” 116
Trumbull captured the essence of the Turner regime when
he declared:
I have no doubt that under this provision of the Constitution
we may destroy all these discriminations in civil rights
against the black man; and if we cannot, our constitutional
amendment amounts to nothing. It was for that purpose that
the second clause of that amendment was adopted, which
says that Congress shall have authority, by appropriate
legislation, to carry into effect the article prohibiting
slavery. Who is to decide what that appropriate legislation
is to be? The Congress of the United States; and it is for
Congress to adopt such appropriate legislation as it may
think proper, so that it be a means to accomplish the end. If
we believe a Freedmen’s Bureau necessary, if we believe an
act punishing any man who deprives a colored person of any
civil rights on account of his color necessary—if that is one
means to secure his freedom, we have the constitutional right
to adopt it. If in order to prevent slavery Congress deem it
necessary to declare null and void all laws which will not
permit the colored man to contract, which will not permit
him to testify, which will not permit him to buy and sell, and
to go where he pleases, it has the power to do so, and not
only the power, but it becomes its duty to do so.117

The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited discrimination against
persons of color when prohibiting slavery. Congress was the
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 475.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 322.
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institution authorized to determine the constitutional law of racial
equality. Congress could pass any measure that promoted racial
equality and full citizenship.
The logic of Thirteenth Amendment foundations for the
constitutional law of racial equality supported race conscious
programs that benefitted persons of color as well as
antidiscrimination measures.118 The fundamental question in the
Turner regime was whether the law undermined slavery, the slave
power, or the slave system.119 Laws that prevented discrimination
against persons of color and laws that provided specific benefits
to persons of color were both constitutional means for
undermining the slave system and for making former slaves full
citizens of the United States. Representative Samuel W. Moulton
of Illinois stated, “[t]he very object of the [Second Freedmen’s
Bureau Bill] is to break down the discrimination between whites
and blacks . . . . Therefore I repeat that the true object of this bill
is the amelioration of the condition of the colored people.”120
Race conscious measures that protected persons of color were
justified because real differences existed between longstanding
white citizens and newly freed slaves.
[N]ever before in the history of this Government have nearly
four million people been emancipated from the most abject
and degrading slavery ever imposed upon human beings;
never before has the occasion arisen when it was necessary
to provide for such large numbers of people thrown upon the
bounty of the Government, unprotected and unprovided for
. . . . [C]an we not provide for those among us who have
been held in bondage all their lives, who have never been
permitted to earn one dollar for themselves, who, by the great
constitutional amendment declaring freedom throughout the
land, have been discharged from bondage to their masters
who had hitherto provided for their necessities in
consideration of their services?121

Laws that discriminated against persons of color, by comparison,
sought to re-establish in different form rather than eradicate
118. This paragraph relies heavily on Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the
Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985).
119. In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 388 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).
120. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 632 (1866).
121. Id. at 939.
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human bondage. Trumbull stated, “under this provision of the
Constitution we may destroy all these discriminations in civil
rights against the black man; and if we cannot, our constitutional
amendment amounts to nothing.”122
The Thirteenth Amendment law of racial equality did not
have a state action limitation. Chase in Turner declared the
indenture unconstitutional, not the state law mandating different
treatment for white apprentices and apprentices of color.123 “The
alleged apprenticeship in the present case is involuntary
servitude,” he maintained, “within the meaning of the[] words in
the amendment.”124 Chase then observed “the indenture” violated
the Civil Rights Act because that private bargain “d[id] not
contain important provisions for the security and benefit of the
apprentice, which are required by the laws of Maryland in
indentures of white apprentices . . . .”125
Charles Sumner when making a Thirteenth Amendment
defense of what became the Civil Rights Act of 1875 made no
reference to any state action limit on federal authority to make
persons of color equal citizens. The senior Senator from
Massachusetts insisted that the scope of Congressional power
under the constitutional ban on slavery was as broad as the scope
of government power.126 If the federal or state government could
regulate an institution, the federal government under the
Thirteenth Amendment could require that institution to refrain
from discriminating against persons of color. Sumner declared,
“[s]how me . . . a legal institution, anything created or regulated
by law, and I show you what must be opened equally to all
without distinction of color.”127 “Theaters and other places of
public amusement” could be prohibited from engaging in race
discrimination, even if they had no common law obligation to
serve all customers because “they are public institutions,
regulated if not created by law . . . .”128 Congress had the power
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 322.
Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339.
Id.
Id.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 825 (1870).
Id. at 242.
Id. at 383.
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to “open to all persons, without distinction of color” all
“institutions which have the sanction of law, which depend upon
law, which depend upon State or municipal authority.”129
Regulations could be benefits. “Whoever seeks the benefit of the
law,” Sumner declared, “must show equality.”130 He insisted that
private colleges be prohibited from discriminating against
persons of color. “I wish under this law to make it impossible for
Harvard College to close its gates against a colored person[,]” he
declared on May 21, 1873.131 “Take all our great institutions of
learning. They are not sustained by ‘moneys derived from
general taxation,’ but they are ‘authorized by law.’”132 Sumner’s
Civil Rights Act would have prohibited religious institutions from
engaging in discrimination. “[W]hen a church organization asks
the benefit of the law by an act of incorporation,” Sumner stated,
“it must submit to the great primal law of this Union—the
Constitution of the United States, interpreted by the Declaration
of Independence.”133
III. THE STRAUDER REGIME
The Supreme Court in the 1870s modified the Turner regime
by changing the textual hook for the constitutional law of racial
equality. Strauder v. West Virginia,134 Ex parte Virginia,135 and
Commonwealth v. Rives136 completed the process by which the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment replaced
the Thirteenth Amendment as the foundation for attacks on race
discrimination.
The shift in textual hook had doctrinal
consequences. The cabining of the Thirteenth Amendment and
corresponding rise of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section One
129. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1869).
130. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 280 (1869); see id. (“[A]ll that my bill
proposes is that those who enjoy the benefits of law shall treat those who come to them with
equality.”).
131. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3267 (1870).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 823; see id. at 896 (“[T]o apply to an incorporated association the great
principles of our Government . . . does not in any respect interfere with religion . . . .”);
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. 3 (1870).
134. 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879).
135. 100 U.S. 339, 344 (1879).
136. 100 U.S. 313, 317 (1879).
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introduced the state action doctrine to the constitutional law of the
United States.137 Constitutional decisionmakers interpreting the
race-neutral Equal Protection Clause were far more prone to use
colorblind rhetoric than Republicans during early Reconstruction
who spoke of a constitutional obligation to transform former
slaves into full citizens.138 Intimations of legislative supremacy
morphed into commitments to legislative primacy. Congress
remained the institution constitutionally charged with
implementing the Equal Protection Clause, but the Supreme
Court determined the scope and nature of that constitutional
commitment to racial equality.
The Strauder regime was anticipated by influential dicta in
the Slaughter-House Cases asserting that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment banned race discrimination
and only race or analogous discrimination.139 Justice Samuel
Miller’s brief analysis in that case on the constitutional ban on
slavery limited the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment to
“servitude.”140 The Fourteenth Amendment, in his view,
contained the provisions that protected the rights of newly freed
slaves.141 The Equal Protection Clause, Miller declared, was the
constitutional provision that banned race discrimination.142 “The
existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated
negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and
hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by
[the Equal Protection C]lause . . . .”143 The Slaughter-House
majority severed equal protection completely from the
antebellum concerns with arbitrary discriminations that
structured the Costin/Manuel regime and help explain why the
persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment preferred race
neutral language to a more explicit ban on race discrimination.144
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
138. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309.
139. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872).
140. Id. at 69; see also Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883) (rejecting a claim that
private discrimination violates the Thirteenth Amendment).
141. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 81.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. The best discussion of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction’s decision to adopt
a race neutral Equal Protection Clause rather than an explicit ban on race discrimination is
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Slaughter-House’s Equal Protection Clause prohibited race
discrimination, whether arbitrary or not, and hardly any, if any,
other discriminations, no matter how arbitrary. Miller concluded:
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a
class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come
within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a
provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case
would be necessary for its application to any other.145

The Supreme Court in Strauder officially made the
Fourteenth Amendment the constitutional foundation for the law
of racial equality.146 Justice William Strong’s majority opinion,
after quoting the text of Section One, declared:
What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be
the same for the black as for the white; that all persons,
whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws
of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose
protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no
discrimination shall be made against them by law because of
their color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are
prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a
positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored
race,—the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation
against them distinctively as colored,—exemption from
legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society,
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which
others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.147

Racial discriminations stood on a different constitutional footing
than other discriminations. States, Strong wrote, “may confine
[jury] selection to males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons
within certain ages, or to persons having educational

Earl M. Maltz, Moving Beyond Race: The Joint Committee on Reconstruction and the
Drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 287 (2015).
145. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 81.
146. For an important discussion of Strauder, see Sanford Levinson, Why Strauder v.
West Virginia is the Most Important Single Source of Insight on the Tensions Contained
Within the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 62 ST. LOUIS L. J. 603
(2018).
147. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879).
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qualifications.”148 Echoing Slaughter-House on the limited scope
of equal protection, the Strauder opinion continued, “[w]e do not
believe the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to prohibit
this. Looking at its history, it is clear it had no such purpose. Its
aim was against discrimination because of race or color.”149
Strong endorsed the Turner regime’s commitment to an
absolute ban on discrimination against former slaves.150 The
Strauder/Virginia/Rives opinions followed Turner by not
exploring whether real differences existed between white persons
and persons of color that might justify limiting juries only to
white people. Strong never discussed whether the West Virginia
law prohibiting persons of color from serving on criminal juries
served a social interest. He did not consider whether real
differences existed between white persons and persons of color
that justified excluding persons of color from juries. What
mattered for the purpose of the constitutional law of equality
under the Fourteenth Amendment was that the State had engaged
in race discrimination. Strong’s majority opinion in Rives
declared, “[t]he plain object of [the post-Civil War Amendments]
was to place the colored race, in respect of civil rights, upon a
level with whites. They made the rights and responsibilities, civil
and criminal, of the two races exactly the same.”151 Ex parte
Virginia reiterated this claim.152 Strong asserted:
One great purpose of these amendments was to raise the
colored race from that condition of inferiority and servitude
in which most of them had previously stood, into perfect
equality of civil rights with all other persons within the
jurisdiction of the States. They were intended to take away
all possibility of oppression by law because of race or
color.153

148. Id. at 310.
149. Id.; see also State v. Underwood, 63 N.C. 98, 99 (1869) (striking down without
explaining in any detail a state law prohibiting persons of color from testifying against white
persons as inconsistent with the state constitution, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866).
150. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
151. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879).
152. See 100 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1879).
153. Id.; see also Underwood, 63 N.C. at 98-99.
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Justice John Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy more
explicitly captured the distinction the Turner and Strauder
regimes made between sociological difference and racial
equality.154
Harlan endorsed the Costin/Manuel regime’s
understanding that real differences exist between the races. He
wrote:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in
education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage, and holds fast to the principles of constitutional
liberty.155

These sociological differences, however, did not make a legal
difference. Harlan continued:
But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there
is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal
before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most
powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account
of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.156

Discrimination was unconstitutional, Harlan made clear, even
when real differences existed between the races.
Strauder broke from the Turner regime by adopting what
later became known as a “banned categories” approach rather
than a ban on discrimination against persons of color.157
Congress, when implementing the Thirteenth Amendment’s
mandate for racial equality, had passed race conscious measures
that favored former slaves, while insisting that persons of color
enjoy the civil rights of white persons.158 Strauder and
subsequent cases ruled out legislation making African Americans
“the special favorite of the laws . . . .”159 A constitutional law of
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554-56 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 559.
Id.
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 383-84 (Harvard Univ. Press 1986).
See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
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racial equality rooted in the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to secure a “perfect
equality of civil rights” rather than provide former slaves and
persons of color with the rights and resources necessary to
become full American citizens.160
The late Strauder regime introduced the state action doctrine
to American law.161 The Thirteenth Amendment that provided
the foundations for the Turner regime banned slavery in toto, not
merely state laws that sanctioned slavery.162 Turner working
within those parameters explored whether the agreement between
Hambleton and Turner was constitutional and whether that
agreement violated federal laws implementing the Thirteenth
Amendment.163 Justice John Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights
Cases articulated the Turner regime’s understanding that
individual behavior as well as government action was subject to
constitutional regulation. He maintained:
Congress, therefore, under its express power to enforce [the
Thirteenth A]mendment, by appropriate legislation, may
enact laws to protect that people against the
deprivation, because of their race, of any civil rights granted
to other freemen in the same State; and such legislation may
be of a direct and primary character, operating upon States,
their officers and agents, and, also, upon, at least, such
individuals and corporations as exercise public functions and
wield power and authority under the State.164

The Fourteenth Amendment that provided the foundation for the
Strauder regime excluded private discrimination when declaring,
“[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”165 The majority opinion in the Civil
Rights Cases emphasized the insertion of “No State” in Section
One.166 Justice Joseph Bradley insisted:
It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited.
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879).
See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 6.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
See In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11-12.
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matter of the amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope.
It nullifies and makes void all State legislation, and State
action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures
them in life, liberty or property without due process of law,
or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the
laws . . . . It does not invest Congress with power to legislate
upon subjects which are within the domain of State
legislation; but to provide modes of relief against State
legislation, or State action, of the kind referred to. It does
not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for
the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of
redress against the operation of State laws, and the action of
State officers executive or judicial, when these are
subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the
amendment. Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment; but they are secured
by way of prohibition against State laws and State
proceedings affecting those rights and privileges, and by
power given to Congress to legislate for the purpose of
carrying such prohibition into effect; and such legislation
must necessarily be predicated upon such supposed State
laws or State proceedings, and be directed to the correction
of their operation and effect.167

In sharp contrast to Turner’s focus on the legal relationship
between Hambleton and Turner, Justice Bradley’s opinion
discussed only what state officials had done and had not done.
The relationship between Robinson and the Memphis &
Charleston Railroad Company under the Strauder regime was
none of the Constitution’s business.168
Strong’s majority opinions in Ex parte Virginia, Strauder,
and Rives modified the Turner regime’s institutional
commitments by developing what we might call legislative
primacy.169 Ex parte Virginia introduced legislative primacy to
the constitutional law of the United States when declaring:
It is not said the judicial power of the general government
shall extend to enforcing the prohibitions and to protecting
167. Id.
168. See id. at 13.
169. See generally Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
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the rights and immunities guaranteed. It is not said that
branch of the government shall be authorized to declare void
any action of a State in violation of the prohibitions. It is the
power of Congress which has been enlarged. Congress is
authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate
legislation. Some legislation is contemplated to make the
amendments fully effective.
Whatever legislation is
appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce
submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to
all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights
and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or
invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of
congressional power.170

The constitutional law of race equality under legislative primacy
requires that Congress be the first mover. Litigants may assert
rights under the Equal Protection Clause only after Congress
passes a statute implementing the Equal Protection Clause.
Congress may implement, but not interpret the Fourteenth
Amendment. Federal courts must review all exercises of
congressional power under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment to ensure that Congress, when regulating race
discrimination, has remained within judicially enforceable
constitutional limits on federal power.171
Strauder illustrates legislative primacy in action. Strong
insisted the litigants base their claim on federal constitutional and
federal statutory law.172 After “[c]oncluding . . . that the statute
of West Virginia, discriminating in the selection of jurors . . .
against negroes because of their color, amounts to a denial of the
equal protection of the laws to a colored man,” he did not
immediately declare the law unconstitutional.173 Instead, Strong
turned to federal statutory law. Strauder continued, “it remains
only to be considered whether the power of Congress to enforce
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment by appropriate
legislation is sufficient to justify the enactment of sect. 641 of the

170.
171.
172.
173.

Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345-46.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305.
Id. at 310.
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Revised Statutes.”174 Strauder succeeded in Strauder because
Congress had passed a law implementing his right against race
discrimination in jury selection and the Justices independently
determined that the federal law in question passed constitutional
muster.175 Strauder and Ex parte Virginia were correct because
the West Virginia state legislature and Virginia bench were
violating a congressional ban on race discrimination in jury
selection and Congress had the power to pass that ban under
Sections One and Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.176 At no
point did any decision in the Strauder/Virginia/Rives trilogy
indicate the federal judiciary could in the absence of a federal
statute declare unconstitutional under Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment state laws limiting juries to white
citizens.
Federal judicial practice in race cases during the late
nineteenth century was structured by this institutional
commitment to legislative primacy. From 1868 until 1896, every
case the Supreme Court decided on the constitutional meaning of
racial equality concerned the constitutionality and scope of
federal laws implementing the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, or
Fifteenth Amendments.177 Some cases were brought by persons
of color claiming rights under the federal statutes Congress
passed when implementing the post-Civil War Constitution.178
Other cases were brought by white persons claiming the federal
law under which they were indicted was not warranted by the
post-Civil War Constitution or that their indictments were not
warranted by federal laws implementing the post-Civil War
Constitution.179
The Justices acknowledged in dicta the
174. Id.
175. Id. at 310-11.
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
177. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
178. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 365 (1886); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110,
113-14 (1883); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 379-80 (1880); Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304;
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 315 (1879). In Pace v. Alabama, Justice Stephen Field
declared that the plaintiff claimed that laws prohibiting interracial marriage “conflict[] with
. . . the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .” 106 U.S. 583, 584 (1883). Field’s brief analysis,
however, also maintained that the prohibition did not conflict with the Civil Rights Act of
1866. Id. at 584-85.
179. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1887); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S.
629, 641 (1883); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4-5 (1883); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
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possibility of claims to racial equality that had no statutory
foundation. “Th[e] [Thirteenth A]mendment, as well as the
Fourteenth,” Justice Joseph Bradley’s opinion in the Civil Rights
Cases declared, “is undoubtedly self-executing without any
ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any
existing state of circumstances.”180 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court for a quarter of a century did not adjudicate a single claim
that persons had rights under the post-Civil War Amendments
independent of the rights Congress had granted by federal law.
Judge William Woods in United States v. Hall captured the
foundational institutional principle of judicial practice in cases
raising constitutional questions about racial equality when he
declared, “to guard against the invasion of the citizen’s
fundamental rights, and to insure their adequate protection, as
well against state legislation as state inaction, or incompetency,
the [Fourteenth A]mendment gives congress the power to enforce
its provisions by appropriate legislation.”181 When discussing the
Equal Protection Clause in particular, Woods asserted,
“[C]ongress has the power, by appropriate legislation, to protect
the fundamental rights of citizens of the United States against
unfriendly or insufficient state legislation . . . .”182
IV. THE PLESSY REGIME
The Supreme Court in Plessy maintained the textual hook of
the Strauder regime, while abandoning post-Reconstruction
institutional commitments and modifying racial equality
339, 340 (1879); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 544-46 (1875); United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1875); see also Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581,
590 (1871) (finding that Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not permit removal of a case to federal
court when state law forbade the witnesses of color from testifying in a criminal case). The
Supreme Court in a series of cases also sustained federal laws protecting persons of color as
constitutional exercises of congressional power under Article I, Section 4 or inherent federal
authority to protect the integrity of federal elections or federal prisoners. See Ku-Klux Cases,
110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884) (Congress has power independently of the post-Civil War
Amendments to prohibit private persons from preventing persons of color from voting);
Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 284 (1892). For an important discussion of these
powers, see generally PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
RECONSTRUCTION (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011).
180. 109 U.S. at 20.
181. 26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282).
182. Id. at 81.
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doctrine.183 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment during the late nineteenth and first part of the
twentieth centuries provided the textual foundation for the
constitutional law of racial equality. Federal courts replaced
Congress as the institution primarily responsible for
implementing the constitutional commitment to racial equality.
The constitutional law of racial equality bifurcated. Racial
discriminations remained per se unconstitutional.
Racial
distinctions were constitutional if, as the revived antebellum
Costin/Manuel regime mandated, they were rooted in real
differences between the races and advanced the public welfare.184
Plessy further entrenched the Fourteenth Amendment as the
textual hook for the constitutional law of racial equality. Justice
Henry Billings Brown’s majority opinion, following SlaughterHouse185 and the Civil Rights Cases,186 cast aside arguments that
race discrimination was an aspect of slavery or a slave system.
“Slavery,” he said when rejecting a Thirteenth Amendment attack
on a Louisiana law mandating race segregation in street cars,
“implies involuntary servitude—a state of bondage; the
ownership of mankind as a chattel, or at least the control of the
labor and services of one man for the benefit of another, and the
absence of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property
and services.”187 As Miller asserted in Slaughter-House,188
Brown in Plessy maintained the Fourteenth Amendment was
enacted because the constitutional ban on slavery did not cover
the Black Codes or related discriminations against former
slaves.189 The Thirteenth Amendment, he stated, “was regarded
183. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543-44 (1896).
184. See id. at 543-44, 548, 550-52; Costin v. Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612, 613-14
(C.C.D.C. 1821) (No, 3,266); State v. Manuel, 3 & 4 Dev. & Bat. 20, 37 (N.C. 1838).
185. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542 (construing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 69 (1872)).
186. See 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883).
187. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542.
188. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 70-71 (the Black Codes “forced upon the
statesmen who had conducted the Federal government in safety through the crisis of the
rebellion, and who supposed that by the thirteenth article of amendment they had secured the
result of their labors, the conviction that something more was necessary in the way of
constitutional protection to the unfortunate race who had suffered so much. They
accordingly passed through Congress the proposition for the fourteenth amendment . . . .”).
189. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542-44.
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by the statesmen of that day as insufficient to protect the colored
race from certain laws which have been enacted in the Southern
States, imposing upon the colored race onerous disabilities and
burdens . . . .”190 The Fourteenth Amendment was Brown’s
source for the constitutional commitment to “the absolute equality
of the two races before the law . . . .”191 The ensuing discussion
in Plessy elaborated on the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole.
Brown did not consider the distinctive meaning of any provision
in Section One. Plessy concluded, “we think the enforced
separation of the races, as applied to the internal commerce of the
state, neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored
man, deprives him of his property without due process of law, nor
denies him the equal protection of the laws . . . .”192
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
became the specific textual hook for the constitutional law of
racial equality over the next thirty years. Justice John Harlan did
not mention the Due Process Clause when discussing what
clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment supported a judicial
decision sustaining a local law that provided high school
education for white children but not for children of color. His
opinion in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education
declared:
[W]e cannot say that this action of the state court was, within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, a denial by the
state to the plaintiffs and to those associated with them of the
equal protection of the laws or of any privileges belonging
to them as citizens of the United States.193

Gong Lum v. Rice omitted the Privileges and Immunities Clause
as a textual hook for the constitutional law of racial equality.194
Chief Justice William Howard Taft’s unanimous opinion stated:
The case then reduces itself to the question whether a state
can be said to afford to a child of Chinese ancestry born in
this country, and a citizen of the United States, the equal
protection of the laws, by giving her the opportunity for a
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 542.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 548.
175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899).
See 275 U.S. 78, 85 (1927).
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common school education in a school which receives only
colored children of the brown, yellow or black races.195

When federal courts immediately before the New Deal spoke on
the constitutional law of racial equality, they interpreted the Equal
Protection Clause and only the Equal Protection Clause. Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., in Nixon v. Herndon declared
unconstitutional a state law prohibiting persons of color from
voting in primary elections because the Fourteenth Amendment
“denied to any State the power to withhold from [African
Americans] the equal protection of the laws.”196
The Plessy regime divided the law of racial equality into the
law of race discriminations and race distinctions. Gilbert Thomas
Stephenson’s influential Race Distinctions in American Law
detailed the nature and significance of these categories. He wrote:
[T]here is an essential difference between race distinctions
and race discriminations. North Carolina, for example, has
a law that white and Negro children shall not attend the same
schools, but that separate schools shall be maintained. If the
terms for all the public schools in the State are equal in
length, if the teaching force is equal in numbers and ability,
if the school buildings are equal in convenience,
accommodations, and appointments, a race distinction exists
but not a discrimination.197

Race discriminations were per se unconstitutional. Such a law,
Stephenson declared, “necessarily implies partiality and
favoritism.”198 Race distinctions were constitutional if, as the
Costin/Manuel regime required, they were based on real
differences between the races and promoted the good of both
races. Race Distinctions in American Law explained:
Identity of accommodation is not essential to avoid the
charge of discrimination. If there are in a particular school
district twice as many white children as there are Negro
195. Id.
196. 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927); see also Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932)
(“The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted as it was with special solicitude for the equal
protection of members of the Negro race, lays a duty upon the court to level by its judgment
these barriers of color.”).
197. GILBERT THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 2-3
(1910).
198. Id. at 4.
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children, the school building for the former should be twice
as large as that for the latter. The course of study need not
be the same. If scientific investigation and experience show
that in the education of the Negro child emphasis should be
placed on one course of study, and in the education of the
white child, on another; it is not a discrimination to
emphasize industrial training in the Negro school, if that is
better suited to the needs of the Negro pupil, and classics in
the white school if the latter course is more profitable to the
white child. There is no discrimination so long as there is
equality of opportunity, and this equality may often be
attained only by a difference in methods.199

State courts during the second half of the nineteenth century
had struggled with whether to distinguish race discriminations
from race distinctions. Sumner, serving as counsel in Roberts v.
City of Boston, insisted that Boston engaged in unconstitutional
race discrimination when mandating separate schools for white
children and children of color.200 He declared, “[t]he separation
of children in the public schools of Boston, on account of color or
race, is in the nature of caste, and is a violation of equality.”201
Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw’s unanimous opinion in Roberts
maintained that government authorities had made a constitutional
race distinction. Shaw “[c]onced[ed] . . . in the fullest manner,
that colored persons . . . are entitled by law . . . to equal rights,”202
but insisted that governing authorities could consistently develop,
with this state constitutional commitment to equality, a “system
of distribution and classification” as long as “this power is
reasonably exercised” and served “the best interests of both
classes of children . . . .”203 Controversies over segregation
intensified in state courts after the Civil War.204 Some state courts

199. Id. at 3.
200. See 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 201-03 (1849).
201. Id. at 202 (argument of Charles Sumner).
202. Id. at 206.
203. Id. at 209. For a detailed account of the debate over segregated schools in Boston,
see J. Morgan Kousser, “The Supremacy of Equal Rights”: The Struggle Against Racial
Discrimination in Antebellum Massachusetts and the Foundations of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 941 (1988).
204. For the struggle over school segregation in state constitutional law and practice
during the fifty years after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, see J. Morgan Kousser,
Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before the University of Oxford (Feb. 28, 1985), in DEAD END:
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in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries took Sumner’s
position that state segregation laws were racial discriminations.
The Supreme Court of Iowa, when declaring unconstitutional a
local ordinance segregating schools, deduced from the principle
that “all the youths are equal before the law” the holding that a
school board could not constitutionally “deny a youth admission
to any particular school because of his or her nationality, religion,
color, clothing or the like.”205 Other state courts followed Roberts
and sustained such measures as race distinctions. The Supreme
Court of Ohio channeled Chief Justice Shaw when concluding,
“[e]quality of rights does not involve the necessity of educating
white and colored persons in the same school . . . .”206 “Any
classification which preserves substantially equal school
advantages,” Judge Day’s unanimous opinion concluded, “is not
prohibited by either the State or federal constitution . . . .”207
Plessy sided with Ohio against Iowa when sustaining a local
ordinance mandating state segregation on streetcars.208 Brown’s
opinion cited Roberts when anticipating Stephenson’s distinction
between race discriminations and race distinctions.209 He
declared:
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY LITIGATION ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN SCHOOLS (1986).
205. Clark v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 24 Iowa 266, 277 (1868); see also People v. Quincy,
101 Ill. 308, 314-15 (1882); Crawford v. Sch. Bd. for Sch. Dist. No. 7, 137 P. 217, 220 (Or.
1913).
206. State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 211 (1871); see also Puitt v.
Comm’rs of Gaston Cnty, 94 N.C. 709, 719 (1888); State ex rel. Stoutmeyer v. Duffy, 7
Nev. 342, 347-48 (1872).
207. Garnes, 21 Ohio St. at 211.
208. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545 (1896) (referencing Garnes, 21 Ohio
St. at 210).
209. See id. at 544 (“The great principle . . . is, that by the constitution and laws of
Massachusetts, all persons without distinction of age or sex, birth or color, origin or
condition, are equal before the law . . . . But, when this great principle comes to be applied
to the actual and various conditions of persons in society, it will not warrant the assertion,
that men and women are legally clothed with the same civil and political powers, and that
children and adults are legally to have the same functions and be subject to the same
treatment; but only that the rights of all, as they are settled and regulated by law, are equally
entitled to the paternal consideration and protection of the law for their maintenance and
security.”) (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass.
(5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1849)).

2 GRABER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021

12/13/21 2:47 PM

KOREMATSU’S ANCESTORS

461

nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as
distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of
the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.210

Race discriminations that abridged “the absolute equality of the
two races before the law” were per se unconstitutional.211 Brown
cited Strauder and other cases in which courts had ruled persons
of color were unconstitutionally denied rights granted to white
people.212 None of these cases required investigation into real
differences between the races and whether the law advanced the
public good. Racial distinctions, by comparison, were governed
by the antebellum principle that different treatment passed
constitutional muster if the different treatment was based on real
differences between people and promoted the public good.
Brown’s opinion in Plessy declared, “every exercise of the police
power must be reasonable, and extend only to such laws as are
enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public good, and
not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class.”213
The Louisiana segregation law satisfied both prongs of the
constitutional test for race distinctions.214 The Plessy majority
had no doubt that real differences existed between the races.
“[D]istinction[s] which [are] founded in the color of the two
races,” Brown confidently stated, “must always exist so long as
white men are distinguished from the other race by color . . . .”215
The judicial majority was as confident that race segregation
promoted the public welfare. Brown maintained that state
legislatures, when mandating racial separation, had acted “with
reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the
people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the
preservation of the public peace and good order.”216
Harlan appears to have accepted Plessy’s differentiation
between race distinctions and race classifications, but not the
Plessy majority opinion’s application of those categories. Harlan
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 545-46.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550.
Id. at 550-51.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 550.
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famously claimed in Plessy that “[o]ur Constitution is colorblind,”217 but he was willing in other cases to treat race conscious
measures as making race distinctions rather than race
discriminations.218 His opinion in Cumming,219 after noting that
the plaintiff had not attacked the constitutionality of race
segregation per se,220 endorsed differential racial treatment that,
Harlan claimed, was based on real differences between the races
and advanced the public good. His unanimous opinion for the
court held that a local school board decision could
constitutionally meet a financial crisis by closing the high school
for students of color while keeping open the high school for white
students when the alternative was closing the elementary school
for children of color.221 The school board’s decision to keep open
the school more children of color attended, Harlan concluded,
“was in the interest of the greater number of colored children
. . . .”222 The ordinance at issue in Plessy did not meet this public
good standard. Harlan pointed out, “[e]very one knows that the
statute in question had its origin in the purpose . . . to exclude
colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white
persons.”223 Segregation in this instance, he continued, did not
advance the good of all races but was rooted in unconstitutional
notions “that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that
they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white
citizens[.]”224 Harlan repeated this emphasis on public purposes
when dissenting in Berea College v. Kentucky.225 Government
could regulate private education, in his view, when “such
instruction is . . . harmful to the public morals or imperils the
public safety.”226 Harlan thought the Kentucky ban on integrated
private schools did not meet this standard because students of
217. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
218. Justice Harlan joined the Supreme Court’s decision in Pace v. State, 106 U.S. 583
(1883), which sustained an Alabama law banning interracial marriage and punishing sexual
relationships outside of marriage more severely when the participants were of different races.
219. See Cumming v. Richmond Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 541-45 (1899).
220. See id. at 543-44.
221. See id. at 544-45.
222. Id. at 544.
223. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 560.
225. See 211 U.S. 45, 67-69 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 67.
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different races were “receiving instruction which is not in its
nature harmful or dangerous to the public . . . .”227
The Plessy regime abandoned the Strauder regime’s eroding
institutional commitment to legislative primacy in race cases.
That commitment never took hold outside of the constitutional
law of race equality. No Supreme Court opinion, when discussing
the constitutional rights of butchers and women in the SlaughterHouse Cases228 and Bradwell v. Illinois,229 respectively,
maintained or implied that the judicial role under the post-Civil
War Constitution was limited to determining whether
congressional statutes implementing Section One of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were constitutional. The
judicial decisions that provided the foundations for the freedom
of contract assumed that federal courts had independent power to
declare state laws unconstitutional and need not wait for
congressional guidance.230 Dicta shortly after Strauder was
decided indicated that, in a proper case, the Justices would
abandon legislative primacy when determining the constitutional
law of race equality. “Th[e Thirteenth] Amendment, as well as
the Fourteenth,” Justice Joseph Bradley’s opinion in the Civil
Rights Cases declared, “is undoubtedly self-executing without
any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any
existing state of circumstances.”231 The Justices in 1896 finally
harmonized the constitutional law of race equality with the
constitutional law of other facets of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plessy and the Plessy regime exhibited the same commitments to
judicial supremacy that developed in other areas of constitutional
law during the late nineteenth centuries.232

227. See id. at 68 (citing in support of dissent freedom of contract cases that insisted
that government regulations that imposed differential burdens had to be based on real
differences between people and serve the public good, but did not cite Strauder or any case
declaring race discriminations to be per se unconstitutional).
228. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
229. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
230. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113, 132-33 (1876).
231. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
232. See ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1989).
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Plessy was the first case discussing the constitutional law of
racial equality in which the Justices, following existing practice
in non-race cases, discussed only the meaning of Section One of
the Fourteenth Amendment.233 No opinion commented on
existing federal legislation or the debates in Congress over race
segregation that occurred when Congress was considering what
became the Civil Rights Act of 1875.234 Justice John Marshall
Harlan’s dissent in Plessy assumed that federal courts had
independent authority to implement Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment. He wrote, “[h]owever apparent the
injustice of such legislation may be, we have only to consider
whether it is consistent with the Constitution of the United
States.”235 At no point did that dissent consider or even mention
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, or any other law Congress had
passed implementing the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection.236 Justice Henry Billings Brown’s majority opinion
did not point to that failure to provide a statutory as well as a
constitutional hook for Plessy’s complaint. Brown assumed, with
Harlan, that the sole issue in Plessy was whether segregation was
consistent with the post-Civil War Constitution and not whether
the judiciary, rather than Congress, was empowered to make that
determination.237
Plessy set the tone for the next fifty years. Congress did not
pass
legislation
implementing
the
post-Civil
War
238
Amendments.
Courts did not first look to legislation already
233. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1120-31 (1995).
234. See McConnell, supra note 233, at 1120-31 (discussing such debates).
235. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
236. Homer Plessy’s lawyers also discussed only constitutional issues. See Brief for
Plaintiff in Error at ___, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. 210), 1896 WL 13990;
Brief for Plaintiff in Error, Plessy v. Ferguson at ___, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. ___), 1893
WL 10660.
237. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542 (“The constitutionality of this act is attacked upon the
ground that it conflicts both with the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution, abolishing
slavery, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits certain restrictive legislation on the
part of the States.”).
238. See Christopher W. Schmidt, Section 5’s Forgotten Years: Congressional Power
to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Before Katzenbach v. Morgan, 113 NW. U. L. REV.
47, 56, 82 (2018) (noting that Congress debated at some length between Reconstruction and
the Great Society measures designed to implement the Fourteenth Amendment but did not
pass any legislation).
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on the books when determining the constitutional law of equal
protection. Williams v. Mississippi, decided two years after
Plessy, implicitly affirmed Plessy’s unspoken institutional
premise.239 Justice Joseph McKenna’s majority opinion held that
Mississippi’s voting laws that were race neutral on their face did
not violate Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment because
plaintiffs had to prove discriminatory administration, not merely
discriminatory motivation.240 As in Plessy, the Justices discussed
only the constitutional rules. McKenna did not consider whether
the plaintiff might have a claim under federal statutory law, nor
did he treat federal statutory law as relevant to judicial power
under the post-Civil War Constitution.241 Subsequent cases
declaring race discriminations violated the Equal Protection
Clause were as oblivious to national legislation as subsequent
cases holding that race distinctions were constitutional. Federal
courts had become the first mover in the constitutional law of race
equality. Whether and when states could implement race
conscious legislation depended entirely on the judiciary. Persons
reading such decisions as Gong Lum or Herndon would have no
clue that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment vested Congress
with the power to implement the Equal Protection Clause or even
that Article I of the Constitution established a national legislature.
V. THE KOREMATSU REGIME
The Korematsu regime abandoned the doctrine of the Plessy
regime, while maintaining that regime’s textual hook and
institutional commitments. The Justices in Korematsu insisted
that the constitutional law of racial equality required courts to
employ a balancing test, with a strong thumb on the side of formal
racial equality.242 One size fits all. Strict scrutiny became the
governing standard whether the law at issue made what the Plessy
regime classified as a race discrimination or a race distinction,
and whether that law discriminated in favor of white persons or

239.
240.
241.
242.

170 U.S. 213 (1898).
Id. at 222-23.
See id.
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-20 (1944).
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persons of color.243 The Equal Protection Clause remained the
source for the constitutional law of racial equality.244 Federal
courts cited the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment when determining whether race conscious state
measures passed the strict scrutiny test.245 The justices
maintained the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
“reverse incorporated” the Equal Protection Clause against the
federal government when determining whether race conscious
congressional measures passed the strict scrutiny test.246
Legislative primacy was consigned to oblivion. Federal courts
were often the first mover in determining the constitutional law
of racial equality. That constitutional law, with the exception of
some flirtations by Warren Court Justices with legislative
supremacy, was what courts said was the constitutional law of
racial equality.
Korematsu introduced the strict scrutiny test to American
constitutional law.247 The first substantive paragraph of Justice
Hugo Black’s majority opinion declared:
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such
restrictions; racial antagonism never can.248

Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone’s majority opinion in
Hirabayashi v. United States seemed to reach the same
conclusion that racial discrimination would be constitutionally
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. For reverse incorporation, see Mark A. Graber, Subtraction by Addition? The
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1501, 1532-34 (2012); Akhil
Reed Amar, Constitutional Rights in a Federal System: Rethinking Incorporation and
Reverse Incorporation, in BENCHMARKS: GREAT CONTROVERSIES IN THE SUPREME COURT
(Terry Eastland ed., 1995).
247. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-20.
248. Id. at 216; see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 111 (1943)
(Murphy, J., concurring) (“Except under conditions of great emergency a regulation of this
kind applicable solely to citizens of a particular racial extraction would not be regarded as in
accord with the requirement of due process of law contained in the Fifth Amendment.”).
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tolerated only when state or federal laws were motivated by
pressing public necessity.249 Stone stated:
Because racial discriminations are in most circumstances
irrelevant and therefore prohibited, it by no means follows
that, in dealing with the perils of war, Congress and the
Executive are wholly precluded from taking into account
those facts and circumstances which are relevant to measures
for our national defense and for the successful prosecution
of the war, and which may in fact place citizens of one
ancestry in a different category from others.250

The strict scrutiny test, as applied in Korematsu and
Hirabayashi, was arguably less protective of Japanese Americans
than the standards laid down during the Strauder and Plessy
regimes. The Japanese exclusion order was a race discrimination
rather than a race distinction. In sharp contrast to Cumming, no
justice maintained that removal benefited more Japanese
Americans than the order harmed. No justice pretended that the
military believed with Stephenson that “equality of opportunity”
on the West Coast for white persons and persons of color was best
“attained only by a difference in methods.”251 The burdens of
exclusion fell entirely on Japanese Americans. Constitutional
decision makers from Reconstruction to World War II had
insisted that such race discriminations were per se
unconstitutional. Plessy stated, “[t]he object of the [Fourteenth
A]mendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of
the two races before the law . . . .”252 Korematsu and Hirabayashi
violated that principle. The Korematsu regime was the first to
interpret the post-Civil War Constitution as permitting
constitutional authorities to engage in race discrimination when
that race discrimination served a public interest, albeit a very
pressing public interest.253 Justice Frank Murphy in Hirabayashi
observed, “[t]oday is the first time, so far as I am aware, that we
have sustained a substantial restriction of the personal liberty of

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

320 U.S. at 113-14.
Id. at 100.
STEPHENSON, supra note 197, at 3.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-19.
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citizens of the United States based upon the accident of race or
ancestry.”254
Korematsu was a clearer break from the official
constitutional law of the Plessy regime than from the racist
constitutional practices of that time. A strong case can be made
that constitutional authorities at the turn of the twentieth century
would have held constitutional federal or state laws that imposed
a wartime curfew on persons of color or excluded such persons
from certain jurisdictions during wartime had such measures been
promulgated and subjected to constitutional scrutiny during the
Strauder and Plessy regimes. Equally as strong a case can be
made that those constitutional authorities would have reworked
the Strauder/Plessy ban on race discriminations to encompass
situations when “pressing public necessity” was thought to
require imposing unique burdens on members of one race.255
Faced with a Korematsu-like fact situation, the racist Fuller Court
would have almost certainly adjusted the line between race
discriminations and race distinctions, and not have applied
mechanically the existing ban on all race discriminations.256
Rather than maintain, as Stephenson did, that a race
discrimination
“necessarily
implies
partiality
and
257
favoritism[,]” constitutional authorities might have tweaked
that claim so that only policies that “implie[d] partiality and
favoritism[]”258 were race discriminations. The point is that such
a move was not explicitly made before World War II. Korematsu,
from the perspective of 1944, weakened the Plessy regime’s
commitment to racial equality, even if that weakening was more
likely in theory than in actual practice.
Korematsu improved upon standards the Plessy regime
employed when considering race classifications, but that
improvement was limited and may have been more theoretical
than real. Black’s opinion suggests that only race discriminations

254. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 111 (Murphy, J., concurring).
255. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
256. See generally OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE,
1888-1910 at 352 (2006) (discussing the racism of the Fuller Court).
257. STEPHENSON, supra note 197, at 4.
258. Id.
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that advance vital social purposes pass constitutional muster.259
Preventing racial mixing on street cars might not meet that
standard. Still, Korematsu did not overrule Plessy or comment
adversely on any past decision sustaining an alleged race
classification. A racist southern constitutional decisionmaker
during the first half of the twentieth century would have little
difficulty finding that preventing racial amalgamation or fights
between the races was a “[p]ressing public necessity . . . .”260 The
Supreme Court of Virginia, when justifying bans on interracial
marriage, declared:
We are unable to read in the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution, or in any other provision of that great
document, any words or any intendment which prohibit the
State from enacting legislation to preserve the racial integrity
of its citizens, or which denies the power of the State to
regulate the marriage relation so that it shall not have a
mongrel breed of citizens. We find there no requirement that
the State shall not legislate to prevent the obliteration of
racial pride, but must permit the corruption of blood even
though it weaken or destroy the quality of its citizenship.
Both sacred and secular history teach that nations and races
have better advanced in human progress when they
cultivated their own distinctive characteristics and culture
and developed their own peculiar genius.261

A judge more attentive to strict scrutiny might have tweaked this
opinion a bit but would not have changed the result.
Korematsu retained the Plessy regime’s and, for that matter,
the Costin/Manuel regime’s deference to elected officials when
determining whether race conscious means advanced pressing
social ends.
The strict scrutiny test in Korematsu and
Hirabayashi was limited to ends. The federal government was
entitled to impose a curfew on Japanese Americans and exclude
Japanese Americans from the West Coast because such
regulations were designed to prevent sabotage and a successful
Japanese invasion of California.262 Preventing a Japanese
invasion of California was a compelling government end.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-20.
Id. at 216.
Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955).
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-20.
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Korematsu was excluded from the West Coast, Korematsu
asserted, “because we are at war with the Japanese Empire,
because the properly constituted military authorities feared an
invasion of our West Coast . . . .”263 The Supreme Court did not
heighten the degree to which justices had previously scrutinized
race conscious means to purported government ends.
Government officials had to establish only some relationship
between the race conscious measure and the end to be achieved.
Stone in Hirabayashi stated, “it is enough that circumstances
within the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for
maintaining the national defense afforded a rational basis for the
decision which they made.”264 Justice William O’Douglas’s
concurring opinion in that case stated, “[w]here the orders under
the present Act have some relation to ‘protection against
espionage and against sabotage,’ our task is at an end.”265 The
Justices were as deferential to governing officials when
determining whether the exclusion orders satisfied the
requirement that race conscious measures be based on real
differences between the races. If the military had some basis for
determining that real differences existed between Japanese
Americans and other citizens, that was good enough during World
War II to sustain a race conscious measure discriminating against
some persons of color. Black stated, “[t]here was evidence of
disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered
that the need for action was great, and time was short.”266 “The
fact alone that attack on our shores was threatened by Japan rather
than another enemy power,” Stone declared in Hirabayashi, “set
those citizens apart from others who have no particular
associations with Japan.”267
Three developments occurred after World War II that made
the Korematsu regime more racially egalitarian than the Plessy

263. Id. at 223; see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 94-95 (1943) (“The
challenged orders were defense measures for the avowed purpose of safeguarding the
military area in question, at a time of threatened air raids and invasion by the Japanese forces,
from the danger of sabotage and espionage”).
264. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 102.
265. Id. at 106 (Douglas, J., concurring).
266. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24.
267. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 101.
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regime.268 First, the Supreme Court obliterated the Plessy
regime’s distinction between race distinctions and race
discriminations. Second, the Supreme Court required that
government officials adopting race conscious measures meet a
higher standard for means as well as for ends. Third,
constitutional decision makers became far more suspicious than
the Korematsu majority that race conscious measures were
actually based on real differences between the races.
The Korematsu regime clearly broke from the Plessy regime
only when the justices abandoned the distinction between
constitutional race distinctions and unconstitutional race
discriminations. This process began during the 1950s when the
Supreme Court indicated that government actions that made race
relevant to a person’s legal standing were subject to strict
scrutiny, even if in a formal sense those measures did not treat
persons of color worse than white persons.269 Bolling v. Sharpe
held that statutes mandating race segregation had to meet the
same standard Korematsu demanded for race discriminations.270
Citing both Korematsu and Hirabayashi, Chief Justice Earl
Warren’s majority opinion declared, “[c]lassifications based
solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since
they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally
suspect.”271 Race consciousness by the 1960s was the touchstone
for strict scrutiny rather than discrimination between white
persons and persons of color who had engaged in the same
behavior. Justice Byron White’s majority opinion in McLaughlin
v. Florida, when striking down a state law that punished
interracial premarital sex more severely than premarital sex
between persons of the same race, declared, “[j]udicial inquiry
under the Equal Protection Clause . . . does not end with a
showing of equal application among the members of the class
defined by the legislation.”272

268.
scrutiny).
269.
270.
271.
272.

See Fallon, Jr., supra note 8, at 1273-74 (discussing the development of strict
Id. at 1277.
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
Id. at 499.
379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
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The mature Korematsu regime insisted on scrutinizing race
conscious means as strictly as Korematsu purportedly scrutinized
government ends. By the mid-1960s, government officials could
no longer point to a rational basis or the equivalent of “evidence
of disloyalty on the part of some” when defending race
classifications or discriminations.273 The constitutional law of
racial equality required race conscious measures to be necessary
or narrowly tailored means to their purported government ends.
“[N]ecessity,” Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in
McLaughlin declared, “not mere reasonable relationship, is the
proper test.”274 Government officials at the turn of the twentyfirst century could no longer blithely expect judicial deference
when they insisted a race conscious measure was based on real
differences between the affected races. Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor insisted that “skepticism” rather than deference was the
attitude courts should take when determining whether a race
conscious measure was a narrowly tailored means to a compelling
government end.275 “Any preference based on racial or ethnic
criteria,” she declared in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
“must necessarily receive a most searching examination.”276
Korematsu did not specify the textual hook for the
constitutional law of racial equality when the federal government
adopted race conscious policies. Black placed more emphasis on
constitutional powers than constitutional rights. His opinion
noted that the military orders at issue in Korematsu were attacked
“as an unconstitutional delegation of power . . . beyond the war
powers of the Congress, the military authorities and of the
President,” and “a constitutionally prohibited discrimination
. . . .”277 The express holding of Korematsu focused entirely on
the Article I powers of Congress and the Article II powers of the
President. Black declared, “we are unable to conclude that it was
beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude
273. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
274. Bolling, 379 U.S. at 197 (Harlan, J., concurring); see id. at 194 (“Such
classifications bear a far heavier burden of justification.”); see also id. at 196 (“Such a law
. . . bears a heavy burden of justification . . . and will be upheld only if it is necessary, and
not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.”).
275. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-24, 227 (1995).
276. Id. at 223 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 276, 273 (1986)).
277. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217.
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those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the
time they did.”278 When discussing what constituted “a
constitutionally prohibited discrimination,”279 Black did not
mention much less discuss the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause, another provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Thirteenth Amendment or any provision in the Bill of Rights.
Hirabayashi was more forthcoming.
Justice Stone
announced that the Fifth Amendment provided the textual hook
for the constitutional law of racial equality when the federal
government adopted race conscious policies. “The questions for
our decision,” he stated, “are whether the particular restriction . . .
was adopted by the military commander in the exercise of an
unconstitutional delegation by Congress of its legislative power,
and whether the restriction unconstitutionally discriminated
between citizens of Japanese ancestry and those of other
ancestries in violation of the Fifth Amendment.”280 At the onset
of the Korematsu regime, a gap existed between the rights
enumerated in the first eight amendments to the Constitution and
the rights enumerated by the post-Civil War Amendments. The
Supreme Court during World War II was no more willing to
interpret the Fifth Amendment as holding the federal government
to standards mandated by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment than the justices had been willing to
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as holding the states to the
standards mandated by the Fifth Amendment.281 Stone in
Hirabayashi declared, “[t]he Fifth Amendment contains no equal
protection clause and it restrains only such discriminatory
legislation by Congress as amounts to a denial of due
process.”282 While “[i]t is true,” Murphy agreed:

278. Id. at 217-18.
279. Id. at 217.
280. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83 (1943); see also id. at 89
(Appellant’s “contentions are only that Congress unconstitutionally delegated its legislative
power to the military commander by authorizing him to impose the challenged regulation,
and that, even if the regulation were in other respects lawfully authorized, the Fifth
Amendment prohibits the discrimination made between citizens of Japanese descent and
those of other ancestry.”).
281. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937).
282. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100.
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[T]hat the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, contains
no guarantee of equal protection of the laws . . ., [i]t by no
means follows, however, that there may not be
discrimination of such an injurious character in the
application of laws as to amount to a denial of due process
of laws as that term is used in the Fifth Amendment.283

As both the Stone and Murphy opinions indicated, the
Korematsu regime regarded the Equal Protection Clause as the
appropriate textual hook for determining whether state race
conscious policies were constitutional.284 The Equal Protection
Clause provided the constitutional foundations for the judicial
decisions declaring state mandated segregation unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court in Brown framed the question before the
Justices as whether “segregation . . . deprive[d] the plaintiffs of
the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”285 Loving v. Virginia held that “restricting the
freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates
the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”286 Justices
in the Korematsu regime determined whether race conscious
measures that benefited persons of color passed constitutional
muster by analyzing the constitutional meaning of “equal
protection.” Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion in Regents of
University of California v. Bakke understood affirmative action
as raising the question whether under the “Equal Protection
Clause . . . discrimination against members of the white
‘majority’ cannot be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as
‘benign.’”287 Justice William Brennan’s separate opinion in
Bakke was similarly grounded on an “analysis of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”288
The gap between the due process law of racial equality that
governed federal race conscious measures and the equal
protection law of racial equality that governed state race
conscious measures vanished as the Korematsu regime matured.
The Brown line of decisions began the process of obliterating the
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. at 112 (Murphy, J., concurring).
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 234-35, 242; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100.
347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954).
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
438 U.S. 265, 294 (1978).
Id. at 355 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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differences between the federal and state law of equal protection.
Schools segregated by federal law met the same fate as schools
segregated by state law. “In view of our decision that the
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially
segregated public schools,” Chief Justice Earl Warren stated in
Bolling, “it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution
would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”289 By
the turn of the twenty-first century, the Justices were insisting that
race conscious federal policies had to meet the same strict
scrutiny standards as race conscious state policies.290 O’Connor
in Adarand declared “congruence” to be a fundamental principle
underlying the constitutional law of racial equality.291 Her
opinion eviscerating any remaining space between federal and
state obligations declared, “[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . .”292
The Thirteenth Amendment remained largely moribund as
an alternate textual hook for the constitutional law of racial
equality. The Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., was the exception that proved the rule.293 The Justices
in that case held that Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment
could prohibit race discrimination in private housing markets.294
Justice Potter Stewart’s majority opinion declared that “the
freedom that Congress is empowered to secure under the
Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a
white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can
live.”295 Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court made any
further effort to integrate this element of the Turner regime into
the Korematsu regime.
The path-breaking federal
antidiscrimination laws passed during the Great Society did not

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
Id. at 224.
Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).
392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
Id. at 439.
Id. at 443.
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mention the constitutional ban on slavery.296 No Supreme Court
opinions sustaining these measures discussed whether these
measures might have Thirteenth Amendment foundations.297 The
Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence paid no heed to
the Thirteenth Amendment but focused entirely on the
constitutional law of equal protection.298
The resulting Fourteenth Amendment law of racial equality
was not as friendly to affirmative action programs as Thirteenth
Amendment law had been during Reconstruction. In sharp
contrast to the Turner regime, which maintained race conscious
programs were a legitimate means for implementing the
Thirteenth Amendment’s commitment to ending both slavery and
the slave system, the Korematsu regime insisted on a race neutral
interpretation of the phrase “equal protection.”299 Justice Lewis
Powell’s crucial opinion in Bakke stated, “[t]he guarantee of equal
protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual
and something else when applied to a person of another color.”300
“The standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause,”
O’Connor’s opinion in Adarand agreed, “is not dependent on the
race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification.”301 Strict scrutiny was not quite as strict when race
296. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73; Voting Rights Act
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 241.
297. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). Remarkably, the petitioners in Heart of
Atlanta Motel raised a Thirteenth Amendment claim when they insisted that the prohibition
of race discrimination was an “involuntary servitude.” Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at
243-44.
298. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). A cottage
industry has developed, however, on the Thirteenth Amendment as an alternative source for
fundamental rights, including constitutional rights to racial equality. See Douglas L. Colbert,
Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. CIV. RTS. CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 1 (1995);
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90
BOS. U. L. REV. 255 (2010); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth
Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1459 (2012); Alexander Tsesis, Into the Light of Day:
Relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment to Contemporary Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1447
(2012); James Gray Pope, Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Badges and
Incidents of Slavery, 65 UCLA L. REV. 426 (2018); Lea S. Vandervelde, The Labor Vision
of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437 (1989).
299. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
300. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90.
301. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995).
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conscious measures benefited persons of color. O’Connor in
Adarand “wish[ed] to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict
in theory, but fatal in fact[]’” when government attempted to deal
with “the lingering effects of racial discrimination.”302 Still,
Congress and state legislatures at the turn of the twenty-first
century did not enjoy the same leeway under the Fourteenth
Amendment as the Reconstruction Congress had under the
Thirteenth Amendment to promote racial equality by employing
race conscious measures.303
All the Judges on the Korematsu court took for granted that
federal courts were responsible for determining the constitutional
law of racial equality. The majority opinions and dissents
quarreled over whether justices should defer to the military
judgment that excluding Japanese from the West Coast was
necessary to prevent a possible Japanese invasion.304 None
suggested that implementing the constitutional law of racial
equality was primarily a legislative task. As was the case with
Plessy, all the Justices on the Korematsu court assumed that they
had the final say in determining whether a measure
unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of race.305 Justice
Frank Murphy’s concurring opinion in Hirabayashi stated: “We
give great deference to the judgment of the Congress and of the
military authorities as to what is necessary in the effective
prosecution of the war, but we can never forget that there are
constitutional boundaries which it is our duty to uphold.”306
“While this Court sits,” he asserted, “it has the inescapable duty
of seeing that the mandates of the Constitution are obeyed.”307
Justice Wiley Rutledge’s concurring opinion in Hirabayashi
rejected claims that “the courts have no power to review any
action a military officer may ‘in his discretion’ find it necessary

302. Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)).
303. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 613 (1990); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 487 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
304. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24; Id. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
305. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
306. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 110 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring).
307. Id. at 113.
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to take with respect to civilian citizens in military areas or zones
. . . .”308
Ironically, the Plessy regime’s abandonment of legislative
primacy made possible the Supreme Court’s decision in
Brown.309 Under the Turner and Strauder regimes, Congress had
to be the first mover when the constitutional law of racial equality
was established. Courts could not consider whether race
conscious measures were unconstitutional race discriminations or
constitutional race distinctions unless Congress had passed a law
prohibiting the race conscious measure under constitutional
attack.310 Senator Charles Sumner insisted during the early 1870s
that Congress prohibit segregated schools311 because he assumed
that courts were unlikely to declare segregated schools
unconstitutional in the absence of federal law banning such
institutions. When introducing what became the Civil Rights Act
of 1875, he spoke of “the absolute necessity of congressional
legislation for the protection of equal rights . . . .”312 Sumner’s
last speech in Congress maintained with respect to segregated
schools, “I most solemnly believ[e] that the only true remedy is
in a national statute, uniform and complete in its operation
everywhere throughout the land . . . .”313 No such congressional
legislation was on the books when Brown was decided. Justice
Robert Jackson’s comment in oral argument, “I suppose that
realistically the reason this case is here was that action couldn’t
be obtained from Congress[,]”314 reflected the Plessy and
308. Id. at 114 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
309. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 554-55; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
310. In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1879).
311. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1871) (statement of Sen. Charles
Sumner).
312. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 381 (1871) (statement of Sen. Charles
Sumner); see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 432 (1872) (statement of Sen. Charles
Sumner) (“[T]hose axiomatic and self-evident truths . . . shall be maintained by the
legislation of Congress carrying out the provisions of the Constitution of the United States.”).
313. 2 CONG. REC. 949 (1874) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner).
314. Schmidt, supra note 238, at 65 (quoting LEON FRIEDMAN, ARGUMENT: THE
ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
TOPEKA, 1952-55 244 (1969)). Jackson repeated this claim in his unpublished draft
concurrence in Brown. Id. He declared, “We are urged . . . to supply means to supervise
transition of the country from segregated to nonsegregated schools upon the basis that
Congress may or probably will refuse to act. That assumes nothing less than that we must
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Korematsu regimes’ commitment to permitting federal courts to
be the first mover in determining the constitutional law of racial
equality. Just as no judge on the Plessy Court considered federal
statutory law relevant to determining whether states could
mandate segregated street cars, so no judge on the Brown Court,
following the practice entrenched only during the Plessy regime,
considered federal statutory law relevant to determining whether
states could mandate segregated public education.
The Korematsu regime replaced legislative primacy with
judicial supremacy. The Justices when implementing Brown not
only did not bother looking for guidance from the elected
branches of the national government but insisted that all
government officials were to be guided by the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the constitutional commitment to racial equality.
In an opinion signed by all nine Justices on the Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Earl Warren in Cooper v. Aaron declared, “the
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle . . . [is] a permanent and
indispensable feature of our constitutional system.”315 Justice
Felix Frankfurter’s concurring opinion piled on. He wrote, “[o]ur
kind of society cannot endure if the controlling authority of the
Law as derived from the Constitution is not to be the tribunal
specially charged with the duty of ascertaining and declaring what
is ‘the supreme Law of the Land.’”316
While the Supreme Court remained the managing partner
throughout the Korematsu regime, the role of Congress in
implementing the constitutional commitment to racial equality
was sometimes analogous to senior partner, sometimes analogous
to junior partner, and sometimes closer to summer associate.
Katzenbach v. Morgan indicated that remedying race
discrimination might be a joint enterprise, with federal courts and
the federal legislature equally empowered to make the
constitutional law of racial equality.317 Justice William Douglas’s
act because our representative system has failed.” DAVID M. O’BRIEN, JUSTICE ROBERT H.
JACKSON’S UNPUBLISHED OPINION IN BROWN V. BOARD 129 (2017).
315. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
316. Id. at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); JAMES D. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: ANDREW JACKSON (2004).
317. 384 U.S. 641, 659 (1966).
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majority opinion held that Congress could forbid states from
denying the ballot to Spanish speakers educated in Puerto Rico,
even though the Supreme Court had previously ruled that literacy
tests were constitutional.318
“Congress might . . . have
questioned,” Douglas wrote, “whether denial of a right deemed so
precious and fundamental in our society was a necessary or
appropriate means of encouraging persons to learn English, or of
furthering the goal of an intelligent exercise of the franchise.”319
City of Boerne v. Flores withdrew any suggestion in Morgan that
Congress might be authorized to interpret independently the postCivil War Amendments.320 Congress was authorized to remedy,
identify, and prevent constitutional violations, but not determine
what actions constituted a violation of the equal protection or any
other clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.321 Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s majority opinion condemned the elected branches of
the national government for trying to overturn a judicial decision
narrowing the free exercise rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.322 He asserted, “[w]hen the political
branches of the Government act against the background of a
judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must
be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will
treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled
principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations
must be disappointed.”323 Shelby County v. Holder further
reduced congressional power to implement the post-Civil War
Amendments.324 Chief Justice John Roberts brazenly challenged
whether thousands of pages of congressional factfinding justified
legislation extending the preclearance provisions of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.325 Congress, he insisted, had to demonstrate
318. See Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941).
319. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654; see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 342
(1966).
320. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654.
321. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524-29.
322. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77 (1990); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
323. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
324. See generally 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
325. Id. at 554.
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“‘exceptional’ and ‘unique’ conditions” when legislation
implementing the constitutional commitment made during
Reconstruction to racial equality trenched on an early
constitutional commitment to state sovereignty.326
A. Compared to What
Whether Korematsu or the Korematsu regime should be
celebrated depends on what the Korematsu regime is being
compared to. Korematsu fares well when compared to the Costin
regime, which permitted states to make race discriminations on
the ground that persons of color were racially inferior to white
people.327 The comparison between the Korematsu regime and
the Turner, Strauder, and Plessy regimes is more complicated.
Each of the latter three regimes has at least one element that
arguably better promotes racial equality than the Korematsu
regime. The Plessy and Strauder regimes treat race as a banned
category.328 The Strauder and Turner regimes require Congress
to be the first mover in implementing the post-Civil War
Amendments.329 The Turner regime treats the Thirteenth
Amendment as the textual hook for the constitutional law of racial
equality.330 These differences make a difference, particularly
with respect to the law of affirmative action and the state action
doctrine. Whether the Korematsu regime improved upon these
past regimes depends on whether one thinks affirmative action
promotes racial equality, whether some version of the state action
doctrine is an appropriate limit on the constitutional commitment
to race equality, and what institution in general at present is most
likely to best implement the constitutional commitment to race
equality.

326. Id. at 555; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334-35 (1966).
327. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944); Costin v. Corp. of
Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612, 613 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266).
328. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 306-07 (1879).
329. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310; In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867)
(No. 14,247).
330. Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339.
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1. Banned Categories

A contemporary Strauder or Plessy regime by taking a
banned categories rather than a strict scrutiny approach to race
conscious discriminations would reverse the result in Korematsu,
at least in theory,331 and the result in Grutter.332 Both the
Japanese exclusion order and affirmative action admissions
programs are race discriminations as race discriminations were
understood at the turn of the twentieth century. Each burdens or
benefits members of one race without providing the same or
equivalent burden or benefit for members of another race.333 As
such, both are per se unconstitutional under the Strauder and
Plessy regimes, but may be constitutional under the Korematsu
regime, which permits government officials to adopt race
conscious measures when doing so is a narrowly tailored means
of achieving a compelling governmental end.334 Whether
returning to this banned categories doctrine of the Strauder and
Plessy regimes improves upon the strict scrutiny doctrine of the
Korematsu regime depends on the most likely forms of race
conscious legislation, whether governing officials can be trusted
to use race conscious measures to promote racial equality, and
whether race conscious measures inherently violate constitutional
commitments to race equality.
For most of American history, Plessy’s banned categories
approach, even restricted to race discriminations as opposed to
race distinctions, would have better promoted race equality than
Korematsu’s strict scrutiny test. A few Reconstruction measures
aside,335 race conscious federal and state laws from the
ratification of the Constitution to the Great Society were means
of maintaining white supremacy and almost always provided
331. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306-07; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at
224.
332. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
333. Although, a good lawyer would claim all persons, even white persons rejected on
racial grounds, enjoy the benefits of diversity. See NATASHA K. WARIKOO, THE DIVERSITY
BARGAIN AND OTHER DILEMMAS OF RACE, ADMISSIONS, AND MERITOCRACY AT ELITE
UNIVERSITIES (Univ. of Chicago Press 2016).
334. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306-07; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at
224.
335. Lundin, supra note 46, at 9.
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benefits only to white people or imposed burdens only on persons
of color. A banned category standard would have outlawed the
common race discriminations that dotted the antebellum
American legal landscape and prohibited the Black Codes that
former confederate states adopted in the immediate aftermath of
the Civil War.336 A banned category standard applied to all race
classifications would have prevented Jim Crow segregation.
Many contemporary progressives have come to prefer strict
scrutiny to banned categories because only during the last thirty
or forty years have most explicit race conscious measures
purported to provide benefits only to persons of color or burden
only white persons. A fair case can be made that from a
progressive point of view, the benefits of a strict scrutiny review
that allows some affirmative action admissions policies in higher
education and some minority set-asides in government
contracting to pass constitutional muster337 outweigh the
occasional explicit racial profiling by law enforcement officers
that might meet that constitutional smell test.338 Justice Stephen
Breyer believes that the contemporary constitutional law of race
equality must give educators at the turn of the twenty-first century
some leeway to make race conscious decisions. His dissenting
opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1 asserted:
The wide variety of different integration plans that school
districts use throughout the Nation suggests that the problem
of racial segregation in schools, including de
facto segregation, is difficult to solve. The fact that many
such plans have used explicitly racial criteria suggests that
such criteria have an important, sometimes necessary, role to
play.339

336. For the Black Codes, see THEODORE BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF
of Alabama Press: Tuscaloosa eds., 1965).
337. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d
1147, 1171 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a minority set-aside program satisfied strict
scrutiny).
338. The issue in most racial profiling cases is providing race consciousness, not
determining whether an explicit race conscious profiling policy satisfies the strict scrutiny
test. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
339. 551 U.S. 701, 861 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
THE SOUTH (Univ.
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Strict scrutiny, or even a lesser form of scrutiny, is superior to
banned categories from a progressive perspective because race
conscious measures may promote as well as frustrate the
constitutional commitment to race equality as antisubordination
or anticaste.340 Justice John Paul Stevens articulated the
antisubordination conception of equal protection in his Adarand
dissent. Condemning the judicial tendency to lump all race
conscious programs, Stevens asserted:
The consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the
difference between a “No Trespassing” sign and a welcome
mat. It would treat a Dixiecrat Senator’s decision to vote
against Thurgood Marshall’s confirmation in order to keep
African-Americans off the Supreme Court as on a par with
President Johnson’s evaluation of his nominee’s race as a
positive factor. It would equate a law that made black
citizens ineligible for military service with a program aimed
at recruiting black soldiers. An attempt by the majority to
exclude members of a minority race from a regulated market
is fundamentally different from a subsidy that enables a
relatively small group of newcomers to enter that market.341

Some higher degree of scrutiny is necessary to distinguish the
“No Trespassing” sign from the welcome mat, but a banned
categories approach throws out the equality promoting baby with
the racist bathwater, so to speak.
Conservatives prefer the Strauder regime to the Korematsu
regime. Justice Clarence Thomas sees no differences between the
race conscious measures of the late Korematsu regime and those
of the Plessy regime. Giving contemporary “school boards a free
hand to make decisions on the basis of race,” he maintains, is “an
approach reminiscent of that advocated by the segregationists in
Brown.”342 Contemporary government officials have no more
capacity to make race conscious policies than the white
supremacists of the past. Thomas asks, “[c]an we really be sure
that the racial theories that motivated Dred Scott and Plessy are a
340. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1471, 1493, 1540
(2004).
341. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
342. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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relic of the past or that future theories will be nothing but
beneficent and progressive?”343 More to the point, conservatives
insist that a banned categories approach recognizes how race
classifications are inherently injurious and by their very nature are
inconsistent with the constitutional commitment to race equality.
Thomas articulates the central understanding of the
anticlassification understanding of equal protection when he
insists, “[t]he Constitution abhors classifications based on race
because every time the government places citizens on racial
registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or
benefits, it demeans all of us.”344
Strict scrutiny, these brief observations highlight, suffers
from a Goldilocks problem. Progressives find the test too hot. A
lower level of scrutiny in the twenty-first century is more than
sufficient to root out the racist race conscious measures of the
past,345 while permitting contemporary race conscious measures
that promote racial equality. Conservatives find the test too cold.
Too often, in their view, strict scrutiny permits university
administrators and others to mask old fashioned race
discrimination under the guise of diversity.346 The standard that
is “just right” awaits a less racially polarized United States.
2. Congress or Courts
A contemporary Turner or Strauder regime, by adopting an
institutional commitment to legislative primacy, would maintain
Grutter but reverse Brown.347 Courts in a regime committed to
legislative primacy are limited to implementing federal
legislation and determining whether federal legislation
implementing the post-Civil War Amendments is constitutional.
A Supreme Court committed to legislative primacy would sustain
343. Id. at 781-82.
344. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016).
345. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234 (1944) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) (claiming that Japanese exclusion order was not “reasonably related to a public
danger”).
346. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 380-85 (2003) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the admissions at the University of Michigan Law School are more
consistent with commitments to quotas than commitments to diversity).
347. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the University of Michigan’s race conscious admissions program
as long as the Justices determined that affirmative action violated
no federal law.348 Courts would sustain segregated schools in
Topeka, Kansas, for the same reason. Congress as of 1954 had
passed no laws prohibiting race segregation in public schools.
The result in Korematsu depends on the version of
legislative primacy employed by government officials. Both the
Turner and Strauder regimes required Congress to be the first
mover. Courts had no independent authority to secure racial
equality in the absence of a federal law mandating racial equality.
Legislative primacy in the Turner regime, at least as understood
by congressional radicals, bordered on legislative supremacy.
Congress was empowered to determine the constitutional
meaning of racial equality as well as the legislation that best
implemented the constitutional commitment to racial equality.
Courts had no business interfering when federal officials
determined that Japanese Americans had to be excluded from the
West Coast. Legislative primacy in the Strauder regime was
weaker. Federal courts had no independent power to enforce the
constitutional commitment to racial equality, but they were
empowered to determine whether federal legislation was
implementing that constitutional commitment. The justices could
not interfere with a state exclusion policy that Congress had not
prohibited, but federal courts could independently determine
whether a congressional exclusion policy met constitutional
standards.
Comparing the virtues and vices of the Turner/Strauder
regime’s commitment to legislative primacy to those of the
Korematsu regime’s commitment to independent judicial review
is difficult. A cottage industry exists comparing judges and
elected officials as rights protectors.349 Much of that literature
highlights the relative contributions the national judiciary and
348. Bakke’s holding that crucial provisions of federal antidiscrimination law were
coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause complicates this analysis. See Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 406 (1978).
349. See, e.g., REBECCA ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONSTITUTION, AND THE
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (NYU Press: New York eds., 2006); JOHN J. DINAN,
KEEPING THE PEOPLE’S LIBERTIES: LEGISLATORS, CITIZENS, AND JUDGES AS GUARDIANS
OF RIGHTS (Univ. Press of Kansas: Lawrence, KS eds., 1998).
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national legislature have made to racial equality in the United
States.350 On the one hand, independent judicial review was once
the only means by which persons of color could obtain relief from
a white supremacist regime. A court committed to legislative
primacy would not have reached any of the Supreme Court
decisions that declared unconstitutional state race conscious
measures handed down before the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.351 On the other hand, independent judicial review at
present is at least as much a boon to white persons challenging
race conscious laws promoting racial equality as to persons of
color challenging race conscious laws preserving white
supremacy. Federal law now protects numerous rights of race
equality and almost certainly would protect against all
manifestations of twentieth century Jim Crow if constitutional
doctrine required Congress to pass additional laws prohibiting
traditional forms of race segregation. State affirmative action
policies and state minority set-aside programs are the two most
prominent race conscious measures that contemporary courts
committed to legislative primacy would not adjudicate.
Disaggregating judicial decisions and federal laws for the
purpose of determining the merits of legislative primacy
compounds these difficulties. Some scholars think Supreme
Court decisions independently implementing the post-Civil War
Amendments inspired federal laws prohibiting garden-variety
race discriminations.352 Michael Klarman’s backlash thesis
proposes that massive resistance to Brown stirred northerners to
support such measures as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.353 Legislative primacy, in this view,
ignores how judicial decisions often spur vital congressional
actions promoting race equality. Gerald Rosenberg insists that

350. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 11; LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN, THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT AND RACIAL MINORITIES: TWO CENTURIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON TRIAL
(Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, UK eds., 2017).
351. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
352. See ARYEH NEIER, ONLY JUDGMENT: THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN SOCIAL
CHANGE 241-42 (Wesleyan Univ. Press: Middleton, CT eds., 1982).
353. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement,
80 VA. L. REV. 7, 85 (1994).
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independent judicial review is a distraction.354 Brown and related
judicial decisions neither directly achieved much desegregation
nor inspired federal legislation prohibiting segregation.355
Legislative primacy, in this view, is institutional
acknowledgement that federal legislation and executive
enforcement are the necessary ingredients of a regime committed
to racial equality.
Matters are further complicated when the distinction
between strong Turner legislative primacy and weak Strauder
legislative primacy are thrown into the comparative mix.
Turner’s combination of legislative primacy and legislative
supremacy keeps judicial hands off federal affirmative action
programs and voting rights laws, as well as off all state race
conscious measures that are not forbidden by federal law.
Strauder’s legislative primacy and judicial supremacy empowers
courts to determine the constitutionality of federal laws
mandating affirmative action programs and implementing the
Fifteenth Amendment, but not race conscious state laws, unless
those state laws are prohibited by federal law. The Korematsu
and Strauder regime’s commitment to judicial supremacy
permitted the Supreme Court to strike down the preclearance
formula Congress mandated when reauthorizing the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, but the result in Shelby County could not have
been reached by judges who adopted the legislative supremacy
commitments of radical Republicans during the Turner regime.
Legislative primacy is most attractive when the dominant
national party has the commitment and power necessary to enact
comprehensive measures promoting race equality.
This
combination of commitment and power has occurred only twice
in American history and for relatively short periods of time.356 A
burst of civil rights legislation occurred during Reconstruction
and during the Great Society.357 During these periods, elected
354. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE 420-29 (Univ. of Chicago Press: Chicago eds., 2d ed. 2008) (discussing
“The Fly-Paper Court”).
355. See id. at 39-169.
356. See PHILIP A. KLINKNER, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 79-81 (Univ. of Chicago Press: Chicago eds., 1999).
357. Id.
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officials could be trusted to implement the constitutional
commitment to racial equality at least as extensively (weak
legislative primacy) and probably more extensively (strong
legislative primacy) as federal courts. At all other times in
American history, justices have been more committed to racial
equality than elected officials, even when that judicial
commitment is quite weak.358
Americans may be entering a third period in which some
version of legislative primacy is an attractive means for securing
racial equality, at least as racial equality is understood by
contemporary progressives.359 Democrats in the 2020 national
election gained control of all three branches of the national
government. Persons of color make up a substantial part of the
Democrat electorate and compose an increasing percentage of the
Democrats in the legislative and executive branches of
government.360 By comparison, the judicial branch of the
national government for the foreseeable future, the Supreme
Court in particular, will be controlled by very conservative
Republicans. Five of these Justices are older white men who are
not old enough that one could safely predict they will leave the
bench in the foreseeable future. Given the dramatically different
understandings of racial equality likely to animate the elected
branches of the national government and the national judiciary,
progressives might be better off returning to the weak legislative
primacy of the Strauder regime, which did not permit the
Supreme Court to strike down state laws in the absence of a
federal law prohibiting such measures, and even better off
returning to the strong legislative primacy championed by
Republican radicals during the Turner regime, which vested
Congress with the power to determine the constitutional meaning
of racial equality.

358. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 350, at 372, 375.
359. This paragraph relies heavily on Jack M. Balkin, Race and The Cycles of
Constitutional Time, MO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), [https://perma.cc/28PQ-GZT3].
360. In Changing U.S. Electorate, Race, and Education Remain Stark Dividing Lines,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 2, 2020), [https://perma.cc/5B94-T2LH]; Anna Brown & Sara Atske,
Black Americans Have Made Gains in U.S. Political Leadership, but Gaps Remain, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 22, 2021), [https://perma.cc/5NW5-QGTT].
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3. Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment

The Turner regime that regarded the Thirteenth Amendment
as the textual hook for the constitutional law of racial equality
might reverse Korematsu, but not Grutter. The point of the
constitutional law of racial equality, from the perspective of the
Thirteenth Amendment, is to ensure that former slaves and other
victims of racial prejudice are treated as equal members of the
American polity. Race neutrality is a means to that end and not
the end sought. Korematsu was wrongly decided because the
exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast was rooted
in historical prejudices against immigrants from Japan and other
Asian countries. Grutter was rightly decided because affirmative
action programs are designed to help persons of color become
equal citizens, do not reflect historic prejudice against white
persons, and are not designed to reduce white persons to secondclass citizenship.
The merits of the Thirteenth Amendment law of race
equality are partly yoked to the merits of affirmative action.
Progressives are likely to celebrate a Thirteenth Amendment law
of race equality because the constitutional ban on slavery
provides stronger foundations for affirmative action programs
than does the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Thirteenth
Amendment is about caste. Congress is empowered to eradicate
slavery and the slave system. The persons who have rights under
the Thirteenth Amendment are those who have experienced
slavery, the slave system, the badges and incidents of slavery, or
the aftereffects of slavery. White persons have no rights under
the Thirteenth Amendment because members of that class have
never experienced slavery, the slave system, the badges and
incidents of slavery, or the aftereffects of slavery. Conservatives
are more likely to celebrate a Fourteenth Amendment law of
racial equality that is more open to being interpreted as
articulating a constitutional commitment to race neutrality or
colorblindness. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
no special treatment for former slaves or their descendants. All
persons, whatever their race, must be treated equally. White
persons complaining about affirmative action programs have
some history as well as text on their side. The evidence suggests
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that the Joint Committee on Reconstruction abandoned a version
of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment limited to race
discrimination in favor of the race neutral Equal Protection
Clause precisely because the latter was thought to better protect
persons of all races.361
The merits of the Thirteenth Amendment law of race
equality are even more firmly yoked to the state action doctrine.
Justices in the Strauder, Plessy, and Korematsu regimes insisted
that the state action requirement was a necessary element of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s law of race equality.362 The Turner
regime, which regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as the source
of the constitutional law of race equality, had no state action
requirement.363 This state action requirement clearly inhibits
efforts to achieve race equality in the United States. Justices have
wielded state action when striking down federal bans on
discrimination against persons of color in places of public
accommodation,364 when permitting racially restrictive covenants
in American housing markets,365 and when allowing private clubs
with state liquor licenses to refuse to admit black members or
guests.366 A Thirteenth Amendment law of race equality might
permit the Justices to reach a more racially egalitarian result in
each of these circumstances on the ground that private
discrimination is a feature of a slave system or a badge and
incident of slavery.367 The Korematsu regime’s commitment to a
state action doctrine that imposes limits on efforts to secure race
equality can be justified, if justified at all, only if state action has
other constitutional benefits that outweigh the costs that doctrine
imposes on efforts to remove the substantial race prejudice
vestiges of the American slave system.
361. See Earl M. Maltz, Moving Beyond Race: The Joint Committee on Reconstruction
and the Drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 287, 297, 315
(2015).
362. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S.
323 (1926); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
363. See In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247); Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412-13 (1968).
364. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3.
365. See, e.g., Corrigan, 271 U.S. 323.
366. See, e.g., Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. 163.
367. See supra notes 362-66 and accompanying text.
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4. Packages

Doctrines, institutional authority, and textual hooks come in
packages. Legislative primacy complements the Thirteenth
Amendment as the textual hook for the constitutional law of race
conscious measures. Congress is better positioned than the
Supreme Court to determine what practices maintain the status
hierarchies first established by the antebellum slave system and
how those status hierarchies are best dismantled without harming
other social interests. The number of employees that should
trigger antidiscrimination obligations raise questions of
constitutional policy best resolved by a legislature rather than
questions of constitutional law best adjudicated by a court. The
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is more
conducive to the rule-bound analysis typically performed by
justices. The closer to “sameness” the rules for implementing the
constitutional commitment to race equality, the better courts are
at constitutional decision making. The Justices who adjudicated
the cases challenging school segregation could have easily
determined that school districts were employing race conscious
measures,368 that the schools for students of color were inferior to
the schools for white students,369 and that in the United States
students of color could have never enjoyed equal education in
racially segregated schools.370
The Korematsu regime may be the best package Americans
can achieve. That regime offers a Goldilocks solution to the
problem of legislative discretion. The Costin and Turner regimes
give elected officials too much power over race conscious
measures. The banned categories approach of the Strauder and
Plessy regimes gives elected officials too little discretion. Strict
scrutiny with judicial review is “just right.” Affirmative action
policies pass constitutional muster, as long as they do not use
racial quotas explicitly and give individualized consideration to
all applicants.371 The state action doctrine remains a limit on
efforts to achieve race equality. Nevertheless, as Terri Peretti has
368.
369.
370.
371.

See Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948).
See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633 (1950).
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003).
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detailed, the justices tend to apply that requirement only when
race is not on the table.372 Goldilocks strikes again, achieving a
balance between prohibiting private race discrimination and
maintaining individual freedom that is close to “just right.”
Comparing the Korematsu regime only to the Costin regime
or the worst features (of which there were many) of the Plessy
regime forecloses discussion of the contributions the Thirteenth
Amendment, legislative primacy, and banned categories might
make to the constitutional law of race equality. The Turner,
Strauder, and Plessy regimes all promote racial equality in some
instances when the Korematsu regime tolerates race conscious
measures that discriminate against persons of color. The Turner
regime’s commitment to the Thirteenth Amendment facilitates
bans on private discrimination. The Turner and Strauder
regime’s commitment to legislative primacy gives Congress the
leeway to determine how best to dismantle racial hierarchies. The
Strauder and Plessy regime’s commitment to banned categories
forecloses legislative excuses for race discrimination. Korematsu
is not the only way, these alternatives demonstrate, even if that
way is better than much of what preceded that understanding of
the constitutional law of race equality.

372. See Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 273, 275 (2010).

